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
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## CONCLUSIONS



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Supplemental Proceedings  
of the 10th Annual Symposium  
on the Role of Behavioral  
Science in Physical Security

# Outthinking the Terrorist: An International Challenge


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**Supplemental Proceedings of the  
10th Annual Symposium on the Role of  
Behavioral Science in Physical Security  
"Outthinking the Terrorist: An International Challenge"**

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23-24 April 1985

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# **10th Annual Symposium on the Role of Behavioral Science in Physical Security**

## **Outthinking the Terrorist: An International Challenge**

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**Tuesday, 23 April 1985**

**8:00 am - 9:00 am**

**Registration**

**9:00 am**

**Opening Remarks**

Lieutenant General Richard K. Saxer, USAF  
Director, Defense Nuclear Agency

**The Problem of Terrorism in Contemporary Societies**

Paul Wilkinson  
Professor, University of Aberdeen, Scotland

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Ray S. Cline  
Senior Associate, The Center for Strategic and International Studies  
Georgetown University

**Lunch**

**"Religionization" of Conflict**

Yonah Alexander  
Director, Institute for Studies in International Terrorism  
State University of New York  
Senior Research Staff Member  
The Center for Strategic and International Studies  
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**The Group Dynamics of Terrorist Behavior**

Jerrold M. Post, M.D.  
Associate Clinical Professor  
Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences  
George Washington University Medical School

**Summation and Future Policy Considerations**

Robert H. Kupperman  
Senior Associate  
The Center for Strategic and International Studies  
Georgetown University

**5:00 pm - 6:00 pm**

**Social Hour**

**6:00 pm**

**Dinner**

**The Psychological Impact of Communication on the Hostage and**

**Family: A Hostage Experience in Colombia**  
Ambassador Diego C. Asencio and Nancy Asencio

**8:30 pm**

**Adjourn**

Wednesday, 24 April 1985

8:30 am

**The Outlook for International Terrorism**

**Moderator:** Paul Wilkinson, University of Aberdeen

**Great Britain:** John A. Dellow, Esq., CBE  
Assistant Commissioner for Crime, Metropolitan Police  
New Scotland Yard, London

**Israel:** Shaul Rosolio  
Former Israeli Ambassador to El Salvador and Mexico  
Former Commissioner General, Israel State Police and  
Border Guard

**Italy:** Franco Ferracuti, M.D.  
Professor of Forensic Psychiatry  
University of Rome Medical School

**Northern Ireland:** Trevor E.T. Forbes, OBE  
Assistant Chief Constable and Head of Special Branch,  
Royal Ulster Constabulary, Belfast

**West Germany:** Reinhard Rupprecht  
Deputy Director, Federal Police Division, Bonn

**United States:** Ambassador Parker W. Borg  
Deputy Director, Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency  
Planning, Department of State  
  
Oliver B. Revell  
Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Lunch

**Multinational Corporations' Response to International Terrorism**  
Deborah M. Jacob  
Senior Vice President and Director of Security  
Security Pacific National Bank

**Terrorism: The Law as an Effective Deterrent**  
E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr.  
Senior Litigation Counsel, U.S. Attorney's Office, Department of Justice

**State-Sponsored Terrorism: Truth and Consequences**  
Arnaud de Borchgrave  
Former Chief Foreign Correspondent, *Newsweek*

**Voices from Troy: What Are We Hearing?**  
H.H.A. Cooper  
President, Nuevevidas International, Inc.

Closing Remarks

6:00 pm

Conclusion of Symposium



# Terrorism: Challenge to the Democracies

Paul Wilkinson

Professor of International Relations  
University of Aberdeen

## What is Terrorism?

Terrorism is not a synonym for violence and insurgency in general. It is a special kind of violence, a weapons system that can be used on its own or as part of a whole repertoire of unconventional warfare. In Central America, for example, terrorism is typically used in conjunction with rural guerrilla warfare and with economic and political warfare in all-out bids to topple governments. But in Western Europe, which experiences about 40 percent of all international terrorist incidents annually, terrorism is usually unaccompanied by any wider insurgency. It is extreme, often indiscriminate violence directed at innocent people, but it is at the preinsurgency phase.

As a working definition of terrorism I suggest the following:

*"the systematic use of murder, injury, and destruction, or threat of same, to create a climate of terror, to publicise a cause, and to coerce a wider target into submitting to the terrorist's aims."*

International terrorism is terrorism exported across international frontiers or used against foreign targets in the terrorists' country of origin. There is no case of purely domestic terrorism, but there are, of course, many campaigns in which the political violence is concentrated in a single national territory or region (e.g., the Irish Republican Army—the IRA—and the Basque and Corsican terrorists).

## Who are the Major Perpetrators?

Nationalist, separatist, and autonomist groups, e.g., the IRA, Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), Front de Liberation National de la Corse (FLNC);

Ideological extremists of left and right, e.g., Rote Armee Faktion (RAF), Direct Action, Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (NAR), neo-Nazis;

Religiously motivated or politico-religious groups (e.g., Shi'ite fundamentalists);

Issue-oriented groups (e.g., those responsible for antiabortion bombings in the United States or "animal rights" attacks in the United Kingdom; and

State-sponsored international terrorism to pursue and murder dissidents, to export revolution, or to wage unconventional war against an adversary (e.g., Qadhafi's hit squads, Iranian hit squads, Bulgarians, and North Koreans).

## What are the Key Trends?

Is it getting worse? Yes. By most experts' calculations, international and domestic terrorism combined are

increasing worldwide at about 30 percent a year in terms of incidents.

Are Western democracies vulnerable? Yes, they have the largest share of incidents—nearly 40 percent of all international terrorism annually.

Is it getting more lethal? In 1983 the United States lost more of its citizens through terrorist attacks in Lebanon alone than it did worldwide through terrorism in the preceding 15 years. Suicide truck bombings, car bombs, time-delay fuses, and other technological innovations have made terrorism potentially more destructive of life and property.

States' resort to terrorism has grown markedly since 1980. Roughly 25 percent of international terrorism's annual incidents can be linked to state sponsors, either directly or indirectly through funding, training, use of "diplomatic" facilities, weapons supply, and so on.

The growing multiplicity of different groups and causes involved vastly complicates the work of Western security authorities.

Since last autumn, an additional and worrying headache has been the emergence of a self-styled international terrorist alliance by extreme leftist groups in Western Europe, aiming primarily at NATO. This alliance includes the RAF, AD (Action Directre), and the Belgian CCC (Cellules Communistes Combattantes). The leaders include Inge Viett, Nathalie Menigon, Jean-Marc Rouillan, and Pierre Carrette. The third-generation leftists are few in number, but tough and cunning. They are difficult for the authorities to catch, and they are especially able to gain by internationalizing their attacks.

## How Serious is the Security Threat?

Democracies are clearly vulnerable to terrorist attacks because of the openness of their societies and the ease of movement across and within frontiers. It is always easy for extremists to exploit democratic freedoms with the aim of destroying democracy. But a well-established democratic political system also has enormous inner strengths. By definition, the majority of the population see the government as legitimate and accountable. They willingly cooperate in the upholding of the law, and they rally to defend democracy against the petty tyrants who try to substitute the gun and the bomb for the ballot box. There is no case in the modern history of terrorism in which a European democracy has been destroyed by a terrorist group and replaced by a proterrorist regime.

Even so, it is clear that prolonged and intensive terrorism can be very damaging to the democratic governments

and societies that experience it. For example, in Northern Ireland and Spain, terrorism not only fundamentally attacks innocent life and rights, it aims to undermine the democratic values, institutions, processes, and rule of law. By scaring away investment and disrupting industry and commerce, terrorism can gravely weaken the economy. At its most intensive, terrorist violence serves to incite hatred, promote and provoke intercommunal conflict and violence, and destroy the middle ground of normal politics. If unchecked, terrorism can easily escalate to a civil war situation, which the terrorist may seek to exploit in order to establish a terrorist-style dictatorship.

In the long run, the threat to Western freedom from the spread of terrorism in Third World areas is far more serious. For terrorism in these often highly unstable areas is much more likely to lead to the undermining of fragile democratic governments and is widely used as part of the repertoire of revolutionary movements to bring about Marxist takeovers of Third World states. These wider revolutionary conflicts clearly alter the regional balance of power in Third World areas. They also threaten Western economic interests, such as access to oil and raw materials, and this threatens Western lines of maritime communication at strategic chokepoints.

Internationally, terrorism is far more than a challenge to the rule of law and a clear threat to individual life and safety. It has the potential to become far more than a minor problem of law and order. For the United States, the major target of international terrorism all over the world, terrorism can be a major national security problem. For example, the handling of the seizure of the entire United States diplomatic mission in Tehran in 1979 became a colossal burden to the Carter Administration, crippling other activities and weakening U.S. morale and prestige internationally, particularly in the Middle East. More recently, the tragic bombings of U.S. marines in Lebanon not only took large numbers of lives, but also severely curtailed President Reagan's military options in the Middle East and made it impossible for him to maintain a U.S. presence in Lebanon, either through the multinational force or independently. The suicide bombers' atrocity reached U.S. opinion, Congress, and the media, as it was clearly designed to do.

### **Why Has the Collective Response of the Democracies Been So Ineffective?**

In a world of sovereign states, it is inherently difficult to secure effective international cooperation. Despite the fact that Western states cooperate in such organizations as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and NATO, it is extremely hard for them to

cooperate in the sensitive area of internal security and law and order. On such matters, they have traditionally taken the view that the national government has total sovereign control. Western politicians and judiciaries are as chauvinistic in this respect as other states, despite the many moral and legal values they have in common with fellow Western governments.

A major practical difficulty in cooperation against terrorism is the lack of a clear single forum for Western democratic cooperation. The European Community does not include all the major Western states, and in any case it is primarily concerned with economic matters. NATO, though it has a larger membership, is by no means comprehensive and essentially remains an intergovernmental organization in which member states jealously guard their national sovereignty. It has been left to the Council of Europe to mount the most serious effort at West European legal cooperation against terrorism, the European Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, but the Council lacks political weight and influence and its convention remains unratified by key states such as France and is unenforceable.

Some Western democracies have little or no direct experience of terrorism, and thus cannot see the importance of the problem.

Enthusiasm for action often dissipates rapidly once shock at a specific outrage has died away.

Some Western governments are unwilling to sacrifice or endanger commercial outlets, possible markets, trade links, or sources of oil or raw materials by taking really tough action against proterrorist states like Libya.

Some states are also afraid of attracting revenge attacks from terrorist states; they hope to buy security by appeasement.

Some have a double standard; they insist on regarding some terrorists as "freedom fighters" who need not be condemned (e.g., Irish-American attitudes to IRA, French attitude to Armenian terrorists, Greek attitude to the Palestine Liberation Organization).

Worst of all is the widespread defeatist illusion, assiduously cultivated by the propaganda of the terrorist movements, that democracies can do nothing to defeat terrorism. This is dangerous rubbish; look at the success of countries like Canada, against the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) and Italy against the Red Brigades.

We do have experience and knowledge showing us how to defeat even severe campaigns of terrorism. It is basically

up to each democratic government to learn and apply these lessons, and to improve its cooperation with fellow democracies.

## **The Democracies' Response**

Terrorism in nondemocratic Third World countries poses problems that are very different from the difficulties posed by terrorism within the frontiers of the Western democracies. It cannot be overstressed that the democracies' response should be geared to the differences of political context. The policies followed should be proportionate and appropriate to the levels of violence faced in the particular case. In broad terms, we can distinguish three different levels of democratic response against terrorism, each of which is subject to its own peculiar constraints and complexities:

The response by democracies against terrorism within their own individual national boundaries;

The collaborative response of democracies working together against international terrorism within their own democratic community of states; and

The response of the democracies against terrorism conducted outside the borders of the democratic community.

We will consider the problems of each level of response in turn.

### **What Should be the General Philosophy of Response by Democracies?**

The hard-line rule-of-law response within certain democratic societies has proved highly effective. I do not say this simply because it is the theory of response that I have championed over the years. It *has* worked—for example, in Italy, in West Germany, and in Canada. It has gained great successes even in Spain and Northern Ireland. The key message on strategy that needs to be communicated urgently and powerfully is that we *can* defeat terrorism and preserve democracy and the rule of law if we follow these key guidelines:

There must be the political will to uphold the rule of law, protect the innocent, and defeat terrorism. Without this, all treaties and conventions are not worth the paper they are written on.

Governments should follow a firm policy of refusing to accede to terrorist demands, especially political demands and demands for the release of imprisoned terrorists.

Acts of terrorism should be treated as common crimes everywhere. Apprehended terrorists should be either

brought to trial and given appropriate punishments under the judicial code or extradited to their country of origin. There should be no "political exceptions" or government connivance at terrorist escapes, and no special treatment or privileges for terrorist prisoners.

Last, but not least, we must destroy the myths of terrorism. We must tell the truth about it: Terrorism is sheer, bloody murder. All who condone or glamourise and encourage terrorism are aiding and abetting the murder and maiming of the innocent. We should not hesitate to say so.

We must convey the vital message that one democracy's terrorist is another democracy's terrorist, an enemy of freedom who can and must be defeated.

But what specific elements should go into the blending of a democratic antiterrorist policy within the borders of the community of democracies if it is to be successful?

An effective and streamlined system of centralized control, coordination, crisis management, and communications is essential.

This must be backed up by top-quality intelligence gathering, analysis, and evaluation. This is a vital prerequisite for effective prevention, deterrence, and countermeasures.

Firm judicial control under the rule of law; this means treating terrorism as a serious common crime. Convicted terrorists should not be given any special privileges or amnesty.

There should be no deals, concessions, or negotiations in dealing with terrorists. The firm upholding of the authority and credibility of the democratically elected government and its properly appointed officers is vital.

There must be a public information and media policy of the highest calibre.

All mainstream parliamentary parties must firmly support the antiterrorist measures.

There must be a sound penal policy that ensures that terrorists do not have the chance to recreate the infrastructure of the terrorist organisation in the prisons.

Any effective democratic response against terrorism must be able to call upon effective social, economic, and political measures to meet the genuine needs and legitimate grievances of the population. The sensitive and rapid use of such measures helps to isolate the terrorists and to cement broad public support behind the government.

There must be an effective defence of liberal values and institutions in the battle of ideas against extremism of all kinds—in the seminar rooms, the media, and the churches, as well as in the political arena.

### **International Cooperation by Democracies Within Their Own Community of States.**

There is a major need for improved international cooperation within the democratic community. Terrorism is inherently international in character. It is almost impossible to find a case of purely domestic terrorism within the democratic community. It is always attractive for the terrorists to cross frontiers to escape justice; to secure arms, ammunition, and money; and to collaborate with fellow terrorists.

Unfortunately, we still lag badly in applying at the international level the hard-line policy that has worked so well in specific countries such as Italy. There is a need to improve the coordination of policy, sharing of intelligence, pooling of counterterrorist expertise and technology, and cooperation in police investigation and extradition of terrorist suspects.

Until we make significant progress, the threat of domestic and internal terrorism within democratic societies will grow more serious and in some cases will threaten the stability and the democratic institutions of the more fragile democracies. (For example, note the fragility of Greek democracy, now that Athens has become a major terrorist centre.) Left-wing Euroterrorism may become the catalyst for better cooperation among democracies, but this still has to be seen.

### **But How Can We Cope With Terrorism Against Western Interests and Personnel Outside the Borders of the Democracies?**

The key constraints are as follows:

The international system contains many terrorist states that will resist any attempt to stop them from using terror as a tool of foreign policy. Therefore a global consensus on measures is impossible.

International law against terrorism does exist, but it is weak and all too often unenforceable. The United Nations has been a broken reed in this field.

Much terrorism in the Third World is part of insurgency and will only be eradicated when the insurgency is ended.

Much of the terrorism in the Third World takes place against governments that not only are nondemocratic, but are often brutally repressive, lacking in popular legitimacy;

in fact, many of these states routinely use state-sponsored terror themselves. How can democracies identify with such governments to the extent of helping them become more successful in repressing terrorism?

Last but not least, if the democracies allow themselves to be provoked into a major use of military force to preempt or retaliate against rogue states in the Third World, there is an obvious risk of major escalation into war, with consequences worse than the evil of terrorism.

### **The Policy Implications for the West**

We must face the fact that the democracies have less scope and less opportunity for tangible successes against international terrorism in the Third World than elsewhere. Some practical security policy considerations are these:

Can we do more to improve intelligence and physical security at our installations abroad?

Can we get more practical assistance from host governments?

Are we making maximum use of our friendly relations with other democracies based in high-risk areas and with other allies there?

The long-term policy must be to at least contain and reduce terrorism against Western targets and presence in these areas through measures such as these:

Prophylactic economic and social measures to reduce the severity of problems for unstable Third World governments;

Diplomatic and political measures to encourage and promote conflict resolution, in both civil and international disputes that engender instability and violence;

The use of such practical international agreements of mutual interest as we can get, for example, the U.S.-Cuba Hijack Pact; and

Most important of all, we must take much more energetic and concerted steps to strengthen democracies in the Third World and to encourage the creation of new democracies. Such action is, in the long term, the surest way of encouraging establishment of a genuine rule of law and democratic attitudes and values. Terrorism flourishes in conditions of growing international anarchy and the collapse of international law.

### **Conclusion**

In the conflicts that characterize growing areas of the Third World, terrorism is usually no more than an auxiliary

instrument in a wider repertoire of guerrilla warfare, economic disruption, sabotage, and insurrection on the streets. Often, in fact, terrorism is an ugly accompaniment to full-scale internal and international war. In these Third World situations, therefore, to concentrate on countering the terrorism is to treat only some of the symptoms of far deeper and more malignant diseases in the international body politic. There is no simple panacea for such wars. They are a challenge to the statesmanship of our government leaders, makers of foreign policy, and diplomats. In this sense, the terrorism in Tehran, Beirut, and Central America is a harbinger of far more deadly and large-scale conflicts, which, in a number of areas—for example, in the Persian Gulf—may have already escalated beyond the power of the international community to contain.

In trying to grapple with these tremendous challenges to international peace, stability, and progress, the medium and smaller Western democracies have tended to look with an almost innocent faith to the greatest democracy, the United States, to solve the problems by sheer economic and military power. But this is neither a fair nor realistic expectation. At the turn of the century, when Britain was still mistress of the seas, that wise British politician, Joseph Chamberlain, pleaded with the Prime Ministers of the colonies, "Gentlemen, we *do* want your aid. . . . The weary Titan staggers under the too vast orb of its fate. . . ." President Reagan and Secretary Shultz would be fully justified in making the same plea today for the assistance of all other democratic states.

It is time that the world community of democracies acted in concert to strengthen the rule of law. It is not just a question of sentimental attachment to American democracy, although millions of people lucky enough to live in freedom today owe that freedom to the generous impulse and courage of America. We owe it to humanity to act. The only way we can hope to ensure the future survival and growth of the democracies in a world that is more just and happy is through close and effective cooperation among the democracies. If we cannot combine our strength to combat the scourge of terrorism within our democracies and among our growing community of democracies, what hope is there for the long-term future of the democratic rule of law internationally? In the words of Edmund Burke, that great philosopher of parliamentary democracy, "For evil to flourish, it is only necessary for good men to do nothing."

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### Paul Wilkinson

Mr. Wilkinson is Professor of International Studies at the University of Aberdeen and a writer on terrorism and conflict. He is a member of the Advisory Council of the Centre for Contemporary Studies; of the Executive Committee of the British International Studies Association; and of the Centre for Defence Studies, University of Aberdeen. His publications include "Social Movement", (1971); "Political Terrorism", (1974); "Terrorism and the Liberal State", (1977); "Terrorism: Theory and Practice" (coeditor 1979); "British Perspectives on Terrorism", (editor 1981); "The New Fascists", (1981); "Britain and the Defence of the West", (1983); and "The Theory of Liberal Democracy", (1983).

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## The Outlook for International Terrorism

**Professor Wilkinson:** Yesterday we had an overview of the field of terrorism and the problems of response internationally as well as within the borders of the democratic state. Dr. Bob Kupperman gave a realistic and, from our point of view, beneficially earthy assessment of the prospects of dealing with terrorism, by pointing out how far we had to go.

In some ways, the depressing realism of his conclusions reminded me of the vision of the human race as the lemmings rushing to the sea. But there has been some progress in the battle against terrorism, and each member of our panel has made a valuable contribution to that progress.

John Dellow, the assistant commissioner for crime at Scotland Yard, was involved in the successful management of the Iranian Embassy siege and has long experience with the special problems of policing terrorism in a capital that, as he has explained in his paper, has a wide range of terrorist groups, both indigenous and international.

Shaul Rosolio has experience in both police work and international diplomacy. For many years he was head of the State Police and Border Guard in Israel, a country surrounded by hostile forces and terrorist groups. He has also served as Israeli ambassador to Mexico and El Salvador and this experience, of course, adds a valuable dimension to our debate.

Franco Ferracuti, professor of forensic psychiatry at the University of Rome, is the foremost criminological expert on terrorism on the Italian academic scene. He is well known as an adviser to many specialized agencies and as an author of many papers and articles.

Trevor Forbes is the assistant chief constable and head of Special Branch in the Royal Ulster Constabulary. The special experience and responsibility Trevor brings to this meeting is of enormous value.

Reinhard Rupprecht is the deputy director of the Police Division in the West German Ministry of the Interior and has long experience in his government's increasingly sophisticated response to terrorists.

From the United States we have Ambassador Parker Borg, deputy director of the Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning in the State Department, and Oliver "Buck" Revell, the assistant director in charge of the Criminal Investigative Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The achievements of the FBI in dealing with terrorism in the United States are not well known in Europe or, for that matter, in the United States. With the exception of one or two dramatic events that do

reach the newspapers, successes in intelligence and prevention are, by their nature, not known to the general public, because preemptive action led to successful termination of the conspiracy to commit terrorism.

This is an unclassified conference, and my colleagues have asked me to point out two things before they begin their contributions: (1) They are not here as representatives of their governments but in their capacity as professionals, as specialists, putting forth their own points of view in this conference. (2) They will obviously not be able to deal with the classified material that might unwittingly crop up in the discussion. Clearly, they will give us as much information as they believe it is proper for us to have, but we will obviously have to accept the fact that there are things that we are not going to be able to hear about in detail in this conference.

I want to explain the format. Each member of the team is to give a brief opening statement. Then the panelists will have an opportunity to comment before the discussion is opened to the floor.

**Mr. Dellow:** I am going to begin by repeating some of what was covered yesterday and then will add a few points of my own.

*I hope that you will forgive me if, as a policeman responsible largely for the operational side of this business, I concentrate on the tactical and force, or agency, strategy levels. The philosophy guiding tactical and local strategies can well be translated into national and international strategies.*

Let us first discuss the trends that were mentioned yesterday, and the trends that will help us to assess threat levels. I agree with virtually everything that Paul Wilkinson and others said on this subject yesterday. In 1970, some 48 countries were affected by terrorists; the number of countries has now risen to 87 and beyond. The breadth of terrorism is also notable; according to a recent count, no fewer than 125 groups were actually claiming attacks, affecting 75 different nationalities.

Moreover, terrorist attacks are becoming more lethal and less discriminate. And the trend is toward attacks on people and property, rather than just property. I do not want to go through all the statistics and issues discussed yesterday, but the key trends may be summarized as a continuing threat from Middle Eastern and Armenian sources.

I say this because I have discarded domestic issues for the purposes of this conference, which focuses on international terrorism. Clearly, I have an interest in Irish Republican terrorism, but here I want to stick with non-Irish Republican terrorism.

So, in view of the continuing threat from the Middle Eastern and Armenian sources and the continuing move toward personal and property targets as opposed to property alone, Western Europe will still receive a high percentage of the terrorist attacks, and diplomats will remain more vulnerable than ordinary persons. But, as I have mentioned, terrorism is becoming more lethal and indiscriminate, and the favorite form of attack continues to be the bomb. The level of lethality is of some concern. In Europe in the past few months, and very likely coinciding with the additional evidence that Paul Wilkinson presented yesterday about the groupings of anarchists and their attacks on NATO property, we have seen a move to much more powerful weaponry, including rocket launchers and grenade launchers.

Terrorists have had to step up their activities in order to retrieve media response. Terrorist incidents that occur simultaneously have to share publicity, so terrorists are looking for something spectacular. Therefore, we will probably see a series of spectacles in the future.

I was interested to hear the reference to the connection between money from drugs and funding terrorism. I have not yet seen great evidence of that, but I am prepared to believe that there is such evidence, and I am concerned about the funding for terrorism that is possible through drugs.

In London, we find that major organized crime and criminals are involved in about five types of criminal activity: theft of extremely valuable consignments, major robberies, counterfeiting, arms dealing, and drugs. Drugs permeate the whole of the other types of crime. Any criminal involved in robbery will, at some other time, be involved in drugs.

If drugs form the basis of funding for terrorism, there is a direct link into other types of crime. The funds that are then available for terrorism are very considerable indeed.

I also see a trend toward the extension of state-sponsored terrorism into direct action by foreign states. One instance of the direct involvement of diplomats in criminal offenses, which got worldwide coverage, occurred in London in St. James Square. Whether that is the beginning of a trend I do not know, but certainly it is something we must watch. Another serious trend involves the activities of legations in various foreign countries that deal with dissidents in a terrorist way.

The whole business of conferences of this kind, which elevate the interest in and, we hope, activity and awareness about terrorism, also holds some dangers.

I am also concerned about problems associated with heightening the public's awareness of the terrorist threat. We are able to maintain a high level of interest and awareness at the national government level, among diplomats and the like, but in London we have problems when we need to have the public aware of what is going on. Often there are long periods of inactivity immediately after a threat assessment is made; as a result, it looks as if we are crying wolf.

We had long periods before and after Christmas when there was a valid threat in London and on the mainland of Britain. It was quite proper to advise the public of that, but the threat lasted for so long that although we were successful in some ways—in the sense that an attack was prevented—the result was that our first level of response to the threat became the norm, and I see considerable danger in that situation.

I also want to point out that investigation and intelligence in the terrorist business are becoming increasingly complex. It is important to ensure that the people who are involved in intelligence gathering and analysis and those involved in the investigation of terrorist activity are specially trained to deal with the complexity.

I have taken steps in London to ensure that the people who are responsible for investigating terrorist incidents now bring together all the disciplines required, in the first minutes of the investigation, so that the investigation can proceed in the most economical, effective, and efficient way. For example, the pathologist must be on the scene immediately. So must the forensic scientists, scenes of crime officers, explosive officers, and the investigating officer himself. All these people need to be there to decide together on the most effective and economical ways to investigate a terrorist incident.

In closing, let me say that we rely tremendously on planning and exercises. Preparedness is a key factor in combating terrorism.

We in Britain, at least, spend a tremendous amount of time in planning. We keep planning absolutely flexible, because one thing that we have learned is that every event can be different from the one that went before. A good example is the Iranian Embassy and the St. James Square sieges.

The same contingency plan was used in both instances, and I think it was successful on both occasions. But the plan had to be totally flexible to take on what were vastly different aspects of siege management. Similarly, hostage taking, bomb incidents, and so on can all entail separate and different attitudes. Preparedness and resoluteness,

both at agency and police force level and the national level, are essential.

**Ambassador Rosolio:** I will confine my remarks to a brief explanation of the strategies and policies my country has followed, because we, in a certain sense, are living in the eye of this problem.

As was mentioned yesterday, Israel has, from the inception of the terrorist problem, regarded terrorism as an extension of war and has treated the phenomenon as such.

Terrorism today is a part of a global attack—perhaps coordinated and perhaps not—on the equilibrium of government and political peace by powers that are interested in destabilizing the West wherever and whenever possible.

This is the way we regard the problem all the time. We firmly believe that it is the grand political design of the Soviet Union to bring about the Finlandization of Western Europe. Israel may be the arrowhead of the Western interests in the Middle East, and it has been treated as such, both by the Soviet Union and by the rest of the world.

In response to this policy, we in Israel have, from the outset, established a set of policy decisions that clearly indicate our thinking.

First, there can be no negotiation with terrorists. Once you consider terrorist activities to be an act of war, you are willing to face the consequences, even in terms of lives. That is a harsh fact, but you cannot jump into the water and come out dry.

During the incident in which a Sabena aircraft was hijacked into Tel Aviv Airport, when our special troops stormed their aircraft, people inside were instructed in Hebrew not to stand up. A woman who panicked stood up and was shot in the head. She was given a military burial, and the public accepted her death as that of a soldier who died in the battle.

Naturally if public opinion opposes government actions, the government finds itself in an extremely difficult position. Therefore, psychological indoctrination within the country must be part of this kind of war: We do not cry wolf all the time, do not disrupt everyday life, but bring to the attention of the public and reach a consensus that actions must be taken and that sometimes the actions, unfortunately, entail loss of life.

Second, because terrorism is an act of war, it must be countered according to the doctrine of indirect response. We do not believe that it is necessary to respond to every act at the same time in the same kind. Holding terrorist

organizations, whoever they are, in suspense as to where and how reaction will come serves to destabilize them, because the war against terrorism is a war of minds as well as of guns.

The basic strategy of terrorism is that the few can harass the many. However, by using correct strategic thinking, we can outwit those who think this way. Unexpected action can completely disrupt the planning process of terrorist groups.

Third, this kind of war is psychological warfare.

Terrorists—and for this brief presentation I am excluding the problem of kamikaze attacks, which is a case apart—basically are people who will not commit an act of terrorism if the outcome will not justify the action. So one way to counter terrorism is to instill confusion into the planning process of terrorist organizations by using psychological warfare, by spreading rumors, by doing all of the things that one does in war. Counterterrorism is not a police action, according to rules of civilian thinking. Counterterrorism requires strategic and political action, because there is no isolated terrorism.

In the final analysis, although the Arabs of the Middle East have very little to do with the quarrel in Northern Ireland, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has been financing and training the Irish Republican Army (IRA). And the PLO has been training the Red Army of Japan. Whether there is an international organization—and I don't think there is—is unimportant, however, we must react to terrorism as though there was. The reaction must not be on an isolated operation-planning level, because this is completely inadequate.

Conducting psychological warfare includes preparing your own citizens. Two weeks after an incident occurs, public attention drops; as a result, an attack might succeed.

The public must be trained or conditioned to accept restrictions without disrupting everyday life. Public awareness can be organized without turning vigilante. No country in the world has enough manpower to man every post round the clock constantly, but the public can be educated to be constantly alert to the security and safety of schools and public places. Even posters on the wall can help: "If you see an unattended package, call the police. If you see things that you don't understand, make us aware." We have found that this type of thing does not undermine public confidence or foster insecurity and fear.

**Dr. Ferracuti:** I want to address one important aspect of combating terrorism: After a terrorist group has surrendered or has been defeated, what is to be done with the surviving terrorists? This problem particularly plagues



Uruguay, Turkey, and Italy, but every country shares it. Past terrorist campaigns had few survivors, and events made life imprisonment or physical elimination the only available alternatives. Occasionally—the Symbionese Liberation Army is a good example—the equivalent of mass suicide took place. In some countries, the legal system provided for long-term, large-scale imprisonment after public trials, thus simply postponing the problem and occasionally creating unmanageable situations in the prison systems.

Because my paper focuses on the Italian system, I should give a few background notes to clarify some crucial points about the Latin law system. Italy has no plea bargaining, no habeas corpus, no turning state's evidence, no jury system. Until recently, pretrial detention could last almost 12 years. The judiciary has become totally independent from the administration, but it is politically active. Inevitably, being a strong and self-regulated career body, the judiciary has tended to intervene in areas where the government was weak or inefficient. Although reforms are in progress, it is fair to say that in Italy magistrates cannot be influenced in any way by anybody.

In Italy, only two major special laws have been enacted against terrorism, and both deal with facilitating exit from terrorist groups. Under the so-called Repentance Law and Disassociation Law terrorists who collaborate with the police or lay down their weapons gain a substantial decrease in their penalties. Other countries have tried or are exploring similar legal instruments, and some have tried various amnesty formulas. The tactical success of the laws is undeniable; about 40 percent of captured terrorists have repented. But the laws have changed and even subverted the basic foundation of our criminal justice system, with some resulting damage both to the image and to the smooth and firm management of the system. I think countries should be aware of this.

Of course, among the various possible types of terrorism, the only one that is interesting from the point of view of the exit from the armed struggle and reentry into society is the pure political type. A Basque separatist can avoid the problem of being identified as a Basque or a Spaniard by migrating to Latin America; an IRA terrorist could migrate to the United States. A Red Brigade has no such alternative. What he wants is another system, and no other system, including the Soviet Union's, is politically acceptable to him. So some other solution must be found.

The police in Italy are now pressing for an extension of the law to other major forms of crime, particularly organized crime and corruption, but most legal scholars oppose any extension. Extension of the Repentance Law to tax

evasion, for example, would have disastrous economic consequences. But there is another point to be made, and this leads me to the behavioral science aspect of this question.

Repentance is a religious and philosophical state, an emotional state with an ethical value. Philosophers like Montaigne and Kierkegaard, in analyzing repentance, have stressed the continuity of the existential trend. The actions for which repentance is felt are not denied; if they were, the change implied in repentance would lack the important referent of what to change. The aspiration to change differentiates repentance, which is oriented toward the future, from remorse, which is a lamentation of the past. The Catholic Church has taken a firm stand in favor of pardon and reconciliation. This has been evident in many instances, some of them widely advertised by the press.

Preliminary data from ongoing research seems to indicate that repentant terrorists are less stable and less well adjusted than hard-core, unrepentant ones. Hard-core, "founding father" terrorists have seldom repented. An Italian terrorist, Libardi, has given an explanation based on the lack of a collective subject to which to subordinate one's own private view and the view of common goals in younger terrorists. Armed struggle as a political project is over in Italy, but the terrorist has to acknowledge this, and that is not easy.

The younger Italian terrorists, those who entered terrorism after 1977, chose terrorism as a path to opportunities they felt were being denied them by society. Once the project failed, they could repent and betray. The message from the hard-core, unrepentant terrorists is, "We're not repentant, we're tired." That's quite different.

A legal scholar named Turnaturi has raised a point about why the repentance laws subvert a criminal justice system. Our legal measure of society has been shifted by the laws on repentance, which erase the terrorist event; the penalty is being canceled by the subsequent repentance and collaboration of the terrorists. As a result, the subject as a member of the society is no longer the sole agent accountable for his deeds and misdeeds. The focus now is on the event, which determines the quality and intensity of the legal reaction, and the event is defined by other events or consequences of events. This is a shift from Kant's and Hegel's concept of men as simply agents of social action to the concept of Marx and Nicholas Lubman, who viewed society as the focus in its complex net of inter-related systems. Thus, indictments, convictions, and penalties go around and beyond the subject. Should this be true, the path would be open for a major revision of some basic trends of Western legal thinking.

**Mr. Forbes:** I want to touch briefly on the terrorism that I know, Irish terrorism. There is a great inclination for people to say, "Terrorism in Ireland has been going on for hundreds of years, and it's an internal thing, so let's forget about it." But terrorist organizations keep changing, and one cannot compare the present, Provisional IRA to the IRA of the 1950's and into the 1960's, and the IRA that fought in the Independence War of 1916, the Rebellion, and so on. They are totally different. The IRA has changed even in the past 15 years.

Moreover, because the world is getting smaller and travel is much easier, we in Ireland are turning up Kalashnikov rifles, Chinese hand grenades, and various other types of weaponry from Eastern Bloc countries. We also know that a lot of firearms are coming from that part of the world, including Libya. The IRA of the past would not have become involved in that sort of situation. When we look at some of the representatives at the IRA's annual general meeting, known as the ARDFEIS, we see people from Nicaragua and from various terrorist groups throughout Europe.

So our problem is not really an internal Irish problem. It also is a sad fact of life—and it grieves one to come here to this great bastion of freedom where democracy is held in such reverence—to find that there are people here who are so misled that they, like the Libyans and others, are contributing weapons and money to terrorism in Ireland. I want to mention only one statistic: Between 1969 and November 1984, a total of 2,843 weapons, believed to be of American origin, have been recovered in Northern Ireland. In the same period, 2,264 weapons of U.S. origin have been linked to 3,789 shooting incidents. The IRA terrorists do not need to come to America or other countries to get their explosives because they have now got people—and, again, this is a change from the past—people with university training in electronics and chemistry who can manufacture their own bombs, their own explosives.

Many of the sophisticated weapons used around the world today—car bombs in Beirut, for example—have long been used by the IRA. The IRA can now launch hand grenades or rockets, or whatever you'd like to call them, containing about 50 pounds of explosives, from the back of a lorry with frightening accuracy. And members of the British Army who have been involved in this conflict say, "I wish we could get our soldiers trained as well in the use of their mortars."

Where do they get the training? They certainly did not train in the west of Ireland. We regard ourselves, therefore, as an international asset, because we know that the IRA terrorists have bombed and will continue to bomb in England and so on. We were very fortunate that the whole

British Cabinet was not wiped out recently. The IRA terrorists will be involved against British military targets in Europe as in the past, and they will need the help there of other terrorist organizations. So the IRA terrorists are international, and our response must also be international. Each organization in the various countries must see the effect of terrorism in different parts of the world, assess the part their country is playing in it, and decide on the response from their own organization.

**Mr. Rupprecht:** In order to keep within the time limit, I will concentrate on a few points that reflect my experiences as a police officer and as manager of an interdisciplinary scientific project in West Germany.

Terrorism has many phases. The types of operations, targets, and aims of terrorists and terrorist groups vary greatly. What is true for one group may not be true for the other. For example, 42 percent of German terrorists have attended a university. The situation may be totally different in the IRA or ETA. Or, another example, Jerrold Post told us yesterday that the average age for terrorists is 22 years; in Germany, the average age of known terrorists is near 30. So underground terrorism, especially, is not a youth problem.

According to circumstances, a terrorist operation may be evaluated as a mere act of *politically motivated criminality* or as an element of undeclared war. For example, terrorist acts can occur in connection with civil war or insurgency, but terrorism in the Western democracies must not be treated as war.

I do not recommend special antiterrorist laws. Terrorists want to make war, and they want to be treated, if arrested, as prisoners of war. If we were to fulfill their demand to put them together in what they call *interactive groups* in the prison, we would indeed, as Paul Wilkinson yesterday said, be fostering a high school of mutual indoctrination.

They try to build up an "anti-imperialist front" in Western Europe, as they call it. The attempt is not new. Antonio Savaster published such an appeal when General Dozier was kidnapped, and we found such an appeal in various strategic papers. But I think that a transnational corporation, with coordinated operations and common propaganda work, is, over the long term, more dangerous than the joint operation commands based only on a personal link, which we saw in former years.

NATO and other military facilities are becoming one of the prime terrorist targets in West Germany. One of the weakest points at the moment is the NATO pipelines; there have been many attacks on NATO pipelines in West European countries in the past few years. This

threat against our defense system will continue and must be combated by stronger protective measures and more intensive international cooperation.

There is only one effective way to combat international and transnational terrorism—through intensive and trusting international cooperation. There are many organizations and levels of international cooperation on the political level, on the police level, in the intelligence family, and there is an urgent need to concentrate and intensify all these measures.

I have found that bilateral cooperation is generally more successful than multilateral cooperation, and that is also true for France, which was criticized several times here yesterday.

We see a continuing tendency toward state-sponsored terrorism; included in this category are terrorist operations that are supported or encouraged not directly by governments but by other political powers in a country. The most recent examples are the assassinations of the Libyan dissident in Bonn and of a Moroccan citizen in Aachen, both by Libyan killers, obviously ordered by the People's Committee, an institutional element of the Libyan regime. At the 9th Annual Symposium here, Brian Jenkins gave an interesting presentation about why state-sponsored terrorism is so hard to counteract. I do not have the time to repeat his convincing arguments, but I believe that there are some instruments we can use better: penalizing states that back terrorist operations by invoking international law and international organizations, political and economic weapons.

I believe that the Soviet Union takes an ambivalent attitude toward terrorism, in line with a pragmatic approach based on political goals and expediency. Despite the use of terror as a political weapon in the Soviet Union, however, the Soviets are aware of the negative consequences that flow from direct support of terrorist activities.

The main repressive instrument to combat terrorism in our countries is intelligence operations with law enforcement. Most of you are experts in police and intelligence work. We must take care not to allow overly zealous data protection campaigns to hinder police and intelligence services from effective interagency and international cooperation.

Over the long term, combating terrorism that grows out of violent social protest cannot be a task only for the police and for the justice system; it can be eliminated only by diminishing the reasons for the protest, that is, by diminishing social conflicts on the macro level, and biological and educational deficits on the micro level. The

media, the school systems, the churches, and everybody must participate in that task.

**Ambassador Borg:** It is difficult to appear number six in a panel when we are all supposed to be talking about more or less the same topics. Let me try to review some of the points that the other discussants have mentioned, but perhaps from a slightly different perspective.

I see six key trends:

Terrorism will be a prominent part of the political landscape in the Western world for the rest of the century. Easy access to weapons of violence makes this forecast a distinct possibility, and modern warfare techniques make it increasingly likely that groups are going to find terrorism an inexpensive way to strike a blow at their enemies. Mass communications will give instantaneous publicity to terrorist acts.

The attacks will be more spectacularly violent in the coming years because of mass media. The innovations of the past 10 years—the taking over of embassies, suicidal car bombs, poisoned Mars Bars, and the like—point to grave dangers ahead such as poisoned water supplies, theft of nuclear devices, and so on.

The sources of terrorist attacks will remain diverse, but the groups should not be regarded as constant factors. Today we have a variety of groups in Europe—the Red Army Faction (RAF), the CCC, the Action Directe—likewise, various groups in the Middle East and in Latin America. Fifteen years ago, within the United States we had the Black Panthers, the Students for a Democratic Society, the Symbionese Liberation Army, and so on. Obviously there have been great changes. Similarly, when we look to the future, we should recognize that similar important changes are likely to take place in the face of terrorism.

Open societies will remain the principal targets of terrorism. Terrorism will pose a threat to democracy in many countries, sometimes by the State succumbing to terrorist activities and sometimes by overreacting to these events. But mass communications and technology will increasingly threaten dictatorships as well, and what threatens the West today is very likely to threaten Eastern and other societies in future years.

A broader spectrum of citizens will be victims of terrorism. Prominent public figures will continue to be targets. Diplomatic and military personnel, who have been important targets during recent years, will account for a declining percentage of the total, whereas businessmen, journalists, and even clergymen will increasingly become targets.

Responses of various governments to terrorist incidents will ebb and flow with the events of the moment. If one looks at the United States, the bombing of our embassy in Beirut last September had an important impact on motivating the U.S. Government to act. We got legislation through the Congress that we might not otherwise have been able to do. Similarly, the alliance among various European terrorist groups caused European states to cooperate more closely. In the United Kingdom, the attack of the Libyan Embassy on the British police caused a united response. But as the event recedes into the past, it becomes more difficult to persuade other governments to join a common front against Libya.

With respect to the second main point that we are supposed to cover in this discussion, I believe that the perception of the terrorist threat is improving. Conferences like this one are very important for increasing understanding and sharing ideas. The number of conferences is increasing to the extent that it is not possible to attend all of them; I know of at least three in the past week that have covered this important subject.

International perceptions of the problem are also improving, but the public quickly forgets what has occurred. Unless there has been a recent event, awareness fades.

How are we going to deal with the problem in the future? It is still inadequately understood. The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism has recently created a "Public Diplomacy Working Group" that aims to enhance understanding of the threat. The dilemma is that we are seeking to improve our understanding of terrorism and its threats without publicizing the acts of terrorists. We do not know quite how to resolve this dilemma; we are considering calling a conference of experts for advice in this matter.

As for areas to improve measures to combat terrorism, I have time to discuss only one such area: how the separate governments are organized to deal with the problem. We in this audience are most familiar with how we handle things in the United States. A variety of agencies have responsibilities: the FBI for domestic terrorism; the Federal Aviation Administration for hijackings; the State Department for terrorism that occurs outside the United States. We attempt to coordinate these activities and our policies through our Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, yet when we go to deal with foreign governments, we recognize how different each government's system for handling terrorism is, and how many different agencies there are in these different governments, and how difficult it is for us in the foreign ministry to try to talk with people in the police agencies or the interior ministries of other countries.

We recently attended a meeting with the West German Ministry of Interior, which was followed 4 days later by a meeting with the West German Ministry of External Affairs. We thought we were discussing the same things; we found that the German Foreign Ministry was not quite so willing to accept the things that the German Interior Ministry had permitted us to discuss. So after the meeting we said, "Where are we now and what are we doing?" And ever since we have been working to try to put things back together again. But organization and compatible systems of communications are essential to dealing with the problem.

**Mr. Revell:** My distinguished colleagues have covered a tremendous spectrum of activities internationally, and of course Ambassador Borg has talked about, at least in general terms, the construction of the antiterrorist matrix here in the United States.

I am going to discuss the existing threat in the United States, because I think most of you are practitioners within at least some portion of the domestic realm.

We in the United States have terrorist groups of various types and deal with terrorism on several different levels. Many of our domestic radical leftist groups have become familiar to you over the years. The May 19th Communist Organization is a group derived from the old Weather Underground that has been with us since the "Days of Rage" in 1968. It was involved in a number of violent terrorist acts in the 1960's and 1970's, generally to protest the Vietnam War, but the organization is also associated with other anti-U.S. positions and many of its members were trained in Cuba under the Venceremos Brigade program and brought back with them a good deal of both ideological training and tradecraft in terrorism and intelligence matters.

The Republic of New Afrika, another group that has been around since the mid 1960's, is based on a Marxist philosophy. It has been involved in a number of terrorist acts over the years, and has now affiliated itself with the May 19th group in carrying out common actions. The groups are not consolidated, but they are affiliated, and they have supported each other with intelligence, safe houses, getaway routes, and in other ways.

A group that we have recently been fairly successful in combating is the United Freedom Front, a group involving two members of the old Weather Underground apparatus, Raymond Levasseur and Thomas William Manning. They were involved in bombings in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Over the past few years they have been involved in a number of armed robberies, and in the past 2 years have been responsible for the bombings of military and government facilities and international corporations in the New York-Long Island area.

We apprehended Levasseur and five of his companions after a long, intensive investigation and surveillance involving joint task forces and cooperating agencies.<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps the most significant domestic groups that we must deal with are those associated with Puerto Rican independence. The two principal groups are (1) the Armed Forces of Liberation (FALN), which operate here in the United States, primarily in the New York and Chicago areas; and (2) the Macheteros, which operate principally in Puerto Rico itself but also in the north-eastern quarter of the United States. The Macheteros have attacked military targets, chiefly through bombings, but they have also assassinated naval personnel and other military personnel. They were involved in a rocket attack on the FBI facility in Puerto Rico in October 1983, and they made a rocket attack, using the LAWS rocket, on the Federal courthouse in Old San Juan in January 1985. By the way, both of the LAWS rockets came from U.S. weapons that were abandoned in Vietnam. Of course, we are concerned about how they ended up in Puerto Rico.

These groups generally use bombings against U.S. Government agencies and facilities. They support themselves with criminal activities that are not identified as terrorist when they occur, for instance, armored-car robberies and bank robberies. Now, obviously, we do not know that these robberies are terrorist related until we solve them, so there is much residual crime associated with these groups that never gets characterized as terrorist related in the public eye or even officially, until we are able to resolve them. The groups' objectives have been opposition to U.S. policy in Puerto Rico, Latin America, and South Africa and to U.S. support for Israel.

On the domestic scene, the extreme rightists have, in the past 2 to 3 years, come into focus. This conference is occurring as one such situation is now coming to fruition: the completion of the search of the so-called CSA compound, the Covenant Sword and Arm of the Lord compound, in Mountain Home, Arkansas. Five persons have been arrested—one CSA member and four members of "The Order," a derivative of the Aryan Nations, a neo-Nazi group that has been involved in assassinations, armed robberies, and other types of criminal activity. These groups are extremely violent. They pose a threat to U.S. law enforcement and potentially to the armed forces, because of the acquisition of weapons, and, of course, to people they oppose, generally along racial and ethnic lines. We have, I think, successfully, indicted the most violent of these groups, The Order. We have arrested 33 persons over the past 3 months. We have had the support of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, the Secret Service, the U.S. Marshal Service

and many State and local agencies; it has been a significant effort.

An affiliated group, the Sheriff's Posse Comitatus, was involved in the killing of two marshals and has been involved in other serious and violent acts. We have found a networking between these groups.

Many members have been associated in the past with the American Nazi Party and the Ku Klux Klan, so there again is historical evolution of these types of activities.

Internationally, of course, we are concerned about transnational groups such as the IRA, the Armenian groups, particularly the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), and the Justice Commandos. We have seen them very active here in the United States and we are trying our best to put them out of business.

Two nations, Iran and Libya, will be discussed at length later. But let me say now that what happens internationally can have a significant impact on terrorism within the United States. We have seen incidents of terrorism sponsored by Libya and Iran here in the United States, and both countries have an existing structure, an apparatus, that can be used by either the Khomeini or the Qadhafi regimes to carry out their programs here in the United States. And that, of course, is of tremendous concern to John Simpson and the Secret Service, who have responsibility for the protection of our President and other senior officials, and, of course, to all of us in the enforcement area.

**Professor Wilkinson:** To begin the discussion, I want to ask one of our international representatives to comment on the improvements he would like to see in application of the new technology to counter terrorism.

**Mr. Rupprecht:** I am sure that the technical equipment of nearly all police forces in the Western world, especially that of the task forces combating terrorism, is similar; they use the best, most modern technology available. We must try to strengthen the international exchange of tactical and technical experiences and other countries must join the exercises of the task forces that have to combat terrorism.

**Mr. Dellow:** This question of technological cooperation is extremely important. After the Brighton bombing, we were very concerned about our ability to search large buildings and be sure that they are clean in terms of explosive devices. Commercial undertakings, such as hotels, pose considerable problems in terms of searching, sterilizing, keeping sealed, and preparing for a conference of the kind that was going to take place at Brighton. The hotels want to make money right up to the last minute

before the conference takes place. Therefore, the ability to search quickly and effectively is important.

Identifying explosives is relatively easy, and there are many ways of dealing with them, providing that one has got the time and the standard equipment. But identifying an operating power source is difficult in any building that already has massive electrical operations.

We have had considerable assistance from the United States since the Brighton incident, and I think that we are working toward something quite useful. But there is much to be learned about the techniques of searching a building in the most effective, economical, and efficient way when one is pressed for time.

I am thinking of assembling a small team with members that represent structural engineering and explosive disciplines, so that we can identify what is likely to happen in any particular building if X amount of explosive is placed in any particular place. This information would give us an indication of the type and pattern of search that ought to be most effective.

**Ambassador Rosolio:** There is no doubt that the scientific research into new means and material is advanced in the various countries that have these problems. But there are two problems to bear in mind: First is the political constraint on international exchange of information; I agree completely that these cooperative agreements have to be bilateral and not multilateral, but the reluctance to share knowledge remains.

Second, intelligence organizations have an inherent fear of unfriendly infiltration from the other services. Whenever you deal with highly sophisticated, secret, tactical, technological, or operational matters, you always fear that maybe somehow the information you just shared with your friend will somehow get to someone who is not your friend.

We are dealing with terrorism, and we all know that one man's hero is the other man's villain. We all know the extent to which the Soviet intelligence system has succeeded in infiltrating Western systems.

I do not know what the solution to this problem is, but perhaps one answer is the personal approach—achieving more intimate knowledge, more intimate connections, because I do not know that there is an institutional solution.

**Professor Wilkinson:** It is interesting that both speakers have strongly endorsed bilateral cooperation as something that is perhaps easier for us to achieve than multilateral.

Trevor Forbes has experienced the value of the bilateral cooperation and perhaps has some views on how it might be improved.

**Mr. Forbes:** This is a sensitive area. You must have absolute trust in the person you are talking to.

How does that trust come about? Perhaps through conferences like this?

**Mr. Dellow:** When I was speaking, I kept very much to the subject of technology. The caveats that are being mentioned by my colleagues are applicable to cooperation in intelligence, but technology is a much more open business, and we are likely to be able to make much more headway, particularly in bilateral agreements, in technology than in intelligence.

**Professor Wilkinson:** I know that Ambassador Borg and his colleagues in the department have thought very deeply about this question of intelligence cooperation, because, of course, it is at the heart of the problems the United States faces in trying to get maximum cooperation in defending American citizens and interests and facilities abroad. I know from what he said in his remarks on the panel that he has been involved in negotiations with the West European specialists involved in this field.

Would he care to comment on the possibilities of improving multilateral cooperation among the closest Western allies, that is, America's most traditional and trusted allies within NATO?

**Ambassador Borg:** Recently, we have been engaged in discussions about sharing technology and intelligence in the NATO forum and elsewhere but we find, in general, that bilateral ties are the best ways to operate.

On the multilateral side, the mechanism we have found most useful is the "Summit Seven." In preparation for the upcoming meeting in Bonn, there have been a whole series of meetings, some more productive than others.

It is critical that each agency in every government work intensely to obtain better intelligence on the terrorist threat. We recently saw a study prepared by the intelligence community in the U.S. about how to deal with international terrorism. In putting this study together, however, the authors failed to recognize that there is much more to dealing with terrorism than simply thinking about the traditional community of the CIA, DIA, and so forth. A whole range of diplomatic security, Customs, and Treasury officers are also collecting information and dealing with this problem. Terrorism is a sufficiently large issue that every government must work through all its internal channels to develop the means necessary to deal with the problem.

So over the last Christmas period in London and just after, there was a need to reduce the awareness in order to be able to elevate it again. Otherwise our top level of awareness among the public would have gone on forever and become the normal level.

**Mr. Lippe:** I am Larry Lippe and I represent the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. I share the views expressed here concerning the need to share intelligence and technology, and I am impressed by the efforts that I have heard discussed. But to what extent do those of you who are engaged in the efforts to share information factor into your discussions and raise at your meetings the fact that the end user of this information may, in many cases, be a prosecutor? We want to treat terrorists as criminals, so we want to prosecute them and let the prosecution serve as a deterrent to others.

But prosecutors frequently have a problem with sources of information. In some cases, information that originally was obtained by ordinary police methods gets into intelligence channels and becomes classified. By the time the information gets to the poor prosecutor, there are all sorts of obstacles to its use.

Now the United States, fortunately, has passed some laws, such as the Classified Information Procedures Act, by which we can protect some classified methods and sources, but the problem has not been solved completely.

So my question concerns what efforts, if any, are being made to coordinate the need for exchange of information that you all agree is needed with the need to ultimately use the information in what, in most countries, is going to be a public forum?

**Ambassador Rosolio:** This problem is a basic one, as we regard terrorists as criminals, not as prisoners of war. Many cases involve information that you cannot use to substantiate guilt, because the sources are secret or foreign. In such a case, the person in charge of the overall operation must decide whether to drop the charges, release the person, extradite him, or whatever.

In cases in which guilt has been established to the satisfaction of the investigators or the investigating agency, we bring in a prosecutor to take part in any further investigation, so that he directs the investigation to satisfy his need to prove guilt in court.

**Mr. Dellow:** I understand the problem you are suggesting. It does not figure so largely in London as it may in the United States, because the tendency is to turn information in ordinary criminal prosecutions into hard evidence. Terrorism is not exactly an ordinary crime, but

we treat it in exactly the same way that we treat ordinary crime. In any event, the scene of a terrorist act produces a tremendous amount of good prosecuting evidence, and, on the whole, we find no great difficulties handling the prosecution.

Of course, in the United Kingdom, we have the Prevention of Terrorism Act, under which one can operate in a field that is not necessarily going to lead to prosecution, but to exclusion. And under those circumstances, of course, one is not inhibited.

And so between the prosecution of straightforward criminal offenses—ensuring that information is turned into hard, presentable evidence, as opposed to reliance on intelligence and information in the prosecution—and the Prevention of Terrorism Act to deal with other matters, we seem to have a good combination.

**Mr. Rupprecht:** I think some people in the intelligence family classify too much information. It is not always necessary to classify this information. If it were not classified, it could then be used in the special case by the police and by the prosecutor.

**Mr. Motley:** Jim Motley, the National Institute for Public Policy. Inasmuch as we face an increasing threat of terrorism—in fact, an international challenge—for the rest of this century, I want to ask whether the formation of a multinational force—military, paramilitary, or law enforcement force—would enhance international cooperation in the battle against state-sponsored terrorism. Are the problems in forming such a force insurmountable?

I also want to ask the panel members whether they believe that the news media have treated terrorist incidents objectively, or have the news media interjected a bias that has led to the misunderstanding of the terrorist threat? And what should we expect in the future from the news media?

**Ambassador Borg:** I can see certain circumstances in which a multinational force might perform very useful functions in combating international terrorism, but when I look at the problems we have had in trying to develop just simple extradition treaties—simple understandings on exchanges of information—I think the current environment prevents the creation of this sort of a multinational force.

On the subject of the news, I think that we only have to look back to the role that the media played in the seizing of our embassy in Tehran a couple of years ago, when students from the middle of nowhere appeared on morning broadcasts all over the United States, with broadcasters asking them, "Well, what are you going to do



today? What are your new demands against the United States?" This behavior by the media certainly extended that crisis far longer than it otherwise would have lasted.

I would like to think that the media had learned something from this situation, but I am not convinced. I am afraid that in the future we will see more of the same. If there's a big news story, one or another member of the media will exploit it for the news potential.

**Dr. Ferracuti:** I agree with the Ambassador's comment on the multinational force. I do not think such a force is feasible, or somebody would have already tried it at the private level.

And we all agree that the media are dangerous and that they are doing a terrible job. But am I prepared to advocate censorship? No. It's as simple as that. The greatest danger from terrorism is that, in order to fight terrorism, we may begin to curtail our own freedom. When we do, terrorism has won.

**Mr. MacLean:** Angus MacLean, Metro Transit Police. I am reading a statement from the *Kiplinger Washington Letter* on which Ambassador Borg may wish to comment:

"Drug Trafficking and Terrorism. Senate hearings will soon expose how narcotics mobs are dishing out cash to international terrorist groups for arms and explosives in exchange for aid in world-wide dope transactions. Even some governments are involved.

"Testimony will reveal the details of how Cuba, Bulgaria and others are helping to bring drugs into the United States."

I wonder if anybody has been detailed to testify, as this is the first that I have heard about the hearings.

**Mr. Revell:** I testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee last week. There is some involvement between terrorist groups and narcotic traffickers in some locations, but we have to be careful not to exaggerate it. Some officials in the Cuban Government have protected individual trafficking operations; they have been indicted, and others may be indicted. I doubt that we will ever have access to them.

We had an operation not long ago in which certain elements of the Nicaraguan Government were found to be protecting an ongoing trafficking operation. We have seen that the M-19 group in Colombia has undertaken some support of individual narcotics-trafficking operations. We have seen the Shining Path group in Peru protect certain cocoa plantations.

In the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, we have seen certain elements of the Palestinian Liberation Organization use hashish and heroin trafficking to support their terrorist operations.

But it would be an exaggeration to say that this joining of international narcotics trafficking with international terrorism indicates some sort of consolidated entity.

**Ambassador Borg:** We also have learned of these hearings, and we asked the organizers to talk with us before the hearings take place so we can reach a common understanding on what these hearings are going to be about and can make them as useful as possible.

**Mr. Van Cleave:** Steve Van Cleave, president of Inter-American Consultants, Inc. I want to ask the panel members if they have noticed any increase in terrorist activities against computer or data processing centers?

I also want to ask Mr. Rupprecht to give us some details on the procedures in the office created for interface between German Government agencies and the private sector in Germany, in terms of exchanging information and assistance relating to terrorist activities.

**Mr. Rupprecht:** In Germany, we have noted that recently terrorists have been attacking more private enterprises, including an increasing number of computer firms. We have been trying to develop a passport that is automatically read at the border control, and the terrorists took this development as a reason to attack computer firms.

In addition, there are some other political issues that help explain why computer firms have become the targets of terrorists.

As for the question about cooperation between security directors of private enterprises and security agencies of the state, there is always a problem with data protection. But we try to do our best and often give private security directors what background information we can to help them perform their tasks. But handling personal data always presents a problem.

**Professor Wilkinson:** This question is of great interest to many people here who are working in industrial concerns or consulting with the industrial firms in liaison with government. Perhaps some more perspectives on that question would be useful.

**Dr. Ferracuti:** Occasionally, we make the mistake of overestimating the terrorists. In Italy, we were very surprised when Red Brigades attacked the wrong computer targets; for example, they attacked the University of Rome's computer, destroying only a lot of dissertations and making many students angry. If I were a terrorist, I would attack the income tax computer or the computer at American Express or the Internal Revenue Service. I don't think that the terrorists have been very smart in this business.



**Professor Wilkinson:** Trevor Forbes, would you like to comment on the special problems of cooperating with industry in an area that has had prolonged and intensive terrorism?

**Mr. Forbes:** We cooperate closely with the business community in Northern Ireland, because the terrorists have singled out for attack businesses that are making a contribution to the economy. And it is significant that in the ghetto areas where they get their support, the terrorists have burnt down the businesses and so on. They have not singled out computers for attack, probably because the technology is too difficult for them.

Part of the reason for attacking business premises and destroying stock and jobs and all the rest is that it doesn't suit the terrorists in our situation to have employment. Particularly in the area where the terrorists have support, they want to keep people unemployed. They want to keep up a certain level of destruction in order to prevent multinational corporations from coming in and setting up industry. If people get jobs and have salaries and so on, then the terrorists will lose some of their support.

I recently spoke to an old IRA man who had been involved in the trouble we had in 1956 and 1960, and I said to him, "Why did you stop in 1960?" He said, "We stopped because we were no longer getting support from the people where we expected it, and once you lose that, you might as well give up."

So it suits the terrorists to attack banks, business premises, and so on in some areas. They have constantly done that to keep unemployment high and to polarize the community. As long as they can do that, they will also help to stop any political movement.

The last thing they want is a situation in which the two groups of people who are opposed to each other in our country can work out a political deal. The terrorists know that if such a deal were to be achieved and were to gain the support of the majority of people, then they are in big trouble.

Incidentally, the terrorists attacked the office that issues driving licenses in Belfast, destroying records and computers, but I do not think the facility was attacked specifically because of the computer. It was just a target that was available to them.

**Mr. Dellow:** I have no evidence of direct attacks on computers, but one problem we know little about is in computer fraud. Funding for terrorism could well take place through computer fraud, which is not reported; on the whole, banks and other people who have an interest prefer not to advertise that sort of thing.

**Mr. Revell:** In the United States we have had no experience with the targeting of computers by terrorists, but, of course, we have had experience with the theft of data. Within the intelligence community, we have taken precautions by encryption and TEMPEST treatment and so forth.

Obviously, computers perform a vital function for our society, and, along with power grids, dams, and other high-risk elements in our environment, computers could pose targeting problems for us. But we have seen no intelligence or evidence that would indicate that any existing group has yet targeted them in the United States.

**Colonel Johnson:** I am Colonel Johnson from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Several members of the panel have talked about the fact that terrorism is likely to be with us for a long time, and that as time passes, terrorist acts may become more violent, even to the extent, perhaps, of an attempt to steal a nuclear device.

That, of course, is one of the concerns of my office; we are responsible for trying to put into place physical security requirements that will prevent any such attempt from being successful. When we discuss this issue, we often speculate that that is an unlikely occurrence, because all the evidence indicates that terrorists would go after a much softer target: a person or a relatively undefended facility.

So my question is, if we, in our business, keep up our guard and present to the terrorists a well-defended area, one that looks to be fairly impenetrable, will we, in fact, continue to deter terrorists from attacks on nuclear weapons sites, or are we sitting on a time bomb that is likely to go off some day?

**Ambassador Borg:** I would like to think that the course of action that the Defense Department and the Department of Energy have taken in the past couple of years is what has prevented any would-be terrorists from even thinking about making such an attempt, or if they thought about the idea, to instantly move on to other possibilities and leave these areas out of the question. But there's no way of knowing, from our perspective.

**Mr. Rupprecht:** We have no evidence that terrorists have ever succeeded in taking possession of nuclear weapons or nuclear material, and I do not believe any security agency in the world has such evidence.

I believe that the construction of a nuclear bomb by terrorists is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Their only chance would be to use conventional explosives for a nuclear device, which is relatively easy to construct. But

again, there is no special evidence that terrorists would succeed in such an operation.

But nuclear weapons and facilities are, in any case, excellent targets for terrorist attacks and threats. And, as I explained before, military facilities and NATO facilities are excellent targets within the primary range of targets of the terrorists.

The physical security arrangements for nuclear weapons and facilities must be independent of actual threats. The arrangements also must correspond to the various possibilities of terrorist attacks, for example, invasion of sensitive areas, insider assistance for a terrorist operation, theft of nuclear material, seizure of an operator of the nuclear installation as a hostage, or bombing of nuclear facilities.

**Mr. Revell:** Even though the likelihood of such an attempt is remote, the consequences are so great that I want to assure everybody that my Bureau, the Department of Energy, particularly the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), for the Department of Energy, and others are engaged in a tremendous amount of contingency planning and operational readiness activities, including the gaming of potential scenarios. To realize the importance of contingency planning, even in the absence of any intelligence or evidence concerning such an attack, all we have to do is to look at the reaction to the situation at Three Mile Island.

**Ambassador Rosolio:** As for whether a group of people will construct a nuclear device in the cellar, I do not think that this is likely in the foreseeable future. But if we are discussing state-supported terrorism, the story is completely different. The people responsible for countering such activities have a necessity to plan how to handle a threat on the part of the state-sponsored terrorists in possession of some kind of nuclear device.

**Professor Wilkinson:** This question of possible macroterrorism, or microproliferation from a perspective of nuclear terrorism, is an important one for us to research. I am not suggesting that the subject is suitable for the open research that we are accustomed to in universities and academic conferences. But certainly in-house, it is reassuring to know that a number of Western governments are doing some good research into the various forms that a nuclear threat might take. They should certainly be examining the possibility of extortion involving radioactive materials simply because they are relatively easy to obtain for such a use. We all know universities, hospitals, laboratories, and industries that routinely use these materials

and, in many cases, do not realize the potential danger associated with the materials. As terrorists are stymied in other tactics, they may well look to some more dramatic tactic, which would certainly have a very disruptive effect, and might have dangerous chemical and biological effects as well. On this subject, I commend to you Kupperman and Trent's valuable survey of the possibilities of microproliferation and of the other forms of chemical and biological threats.

**Dr. Ferracuti:** Megaterrorism is conceivable only in certain forms of terrorism, for example, state-supported terrorism or crazy right-wing type of terrorism. As long as terrorism is meant as a political act, terrorists cannot blow up an atomic bomb in New York City and still expect to get public support for their cause. The likelihood is for, if anything, a chemical attack or the threat of a chemical attack. You all remember the Tylenol scare; just conceive of such an action on a larger scale.

I am more worried by the identification or use or corruption of the antinuclear movements by terrorists; I am concerned about the extent to which antinuclear groups in Germany and in Israel can be transformed into a more violent form of protest.

**Mr. Simeone:** My name is John Simeone, and I am with the FBI. I want to ask Trevor Forbes about whether the direct attacks on his forces in Northern Ireland—including a recent mortar attack in which six officers were killed—have had any significant effect on the morale of his force. Have you had to take any extra precautions in looking at that? Also, have their families been subject to any type of direct attack, and has there been any psychological effect on the families of your officers?

**Mr. Forbes:** When you mention six policemen killed, in fact, it was nine, and a few days later, two more were killed in the same area. We have lived with this situation, as I said earlier, for 15 years, and I suppose human beings can get used to anything. Therefore, we have become used to it. Terrorism is a daily thing with us. We live with it the same as you live with other serious crime. Certainly, deaths of officers and deaths in the civilian population—and there are many—cause many problems.

The attacks have not, strangely enough, affected morale, but we work closely with our police federation, which is what you might call a trade union within the force. And we work closely with the force doctors. We stress to those on a middle command level that they must identify any sign of a morale problem in any person. We take

steps to help them deal with it. It might mean transferring the man to another station where things would be easier.

We are constantly watching the men who are in dangerous stations, noting how long they have been there and how long we are going to leave them there. Curiously, some of them thrive on it far longer than we could have expected, while others don't.

We have had attacks on retired police officers; in fact, I know of three fairly senior officers whose houses were bombed in the middle of the night when they and their families were in bed. Half of the houses were blown away, but nobody was killed.

Again, the way to prevent such attacks and to reassure members is by having good intelligence. And for every attack on a policeman, there are many more attacks that have been prevented, because we have known about them beforehand through a good, solid intelligence system built up over the years. But the brief answer to your question is no, we don't really have a morale problem.

### About the Panel

**Paul Wilkinson**, Moderator, is Professor of International Studies at the University of Aberdeen and a writer on terrorism and conflict. He is a member of the Advisory Council of the Centre for Contemporary Studies; of the Executive Committee of the British International Studies Association; and of the Centre for Defence Studies, University of Aberdeen. His publications include *Social Movement* (1971); *Political Terrorism* (1974); *Terrorism and the Liberal State* (1977); *Terrorism: Theory and Practice* (coeditor 1979); *British Perspectives on Terrorism* (editor 1981); *The New Fascists* (1981); *Britain and the Defence of the West* (1983); and *The Theory of Liberal Democracy* (1983).

**Ambassador Parker W. Borg** has been, since August 1984, Deputy Director of the State Department's Office for Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning. Previously, he served as Ambassador to the Republic of Mali, as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, as Special Assistant to the Director General of the Foreign Service, and as Staff Director in the Executive Secretariat.

**Arnaud de Borchgrave** is editor in chief of the *Washington Times*. He is a former chief foreign correspondent for *Newsweek* magazine and was associated with the Georgetown University, Center for Strategic and International Studies, until March 1985, when he joined the *Times*.

**John A. Dellow, CBE**, is the Assistant Commissioner for Crime in the Criminal Investigation Department, New Scotland Yard. He has been a police officer since 1951, moving to the Metropolitan Police in 1973. In October 1979, he was placed in control of public order at New Scotland Yard, and, in May 1980, he was police officer in charge of operations at the Iranian Embassy siege. Mr. Dellow took charge of the Criminal Investigation Department at New Scotland Yard in March 1984. His operational spheres include Special Branch, all investigations of serious crime, the intelligence and antiterrorist branches, and the Metropolitan Police Forensic Science Laboratory. Mr. Dellow is the British representative of the ICPO (INTERPOL).

**Shaul Rosolio** was, from 1972 to 1977, the Commissioner General of the Israeli Police and Border Guard. In 1977, he became Israel's Ambassador to Mexico and then Israel's Ambassador to El Salvador. In his 30 years of police service, Mr. Rosolio has served in many command and training capacities and, as Commissioner for Jerusalem and the Southern District, was responsible for overall security in Jerusalem before, during, and after the Six-Day War in 1967. He is now a private consultant and lectures extensively on antiterrorism and law enforcement.

**Franco Ferracuti, M.D.**, is Professor of Criminological Medicine and Forensic Psychiatry, University of Rome Medical School. He has published 180 papers and monographs on several areas in the field of crime and forensic psychiatry and has served as advisor on terrorism to the Italian Ministry of Interior. He is currently conducting research on personality aspects of left- and rightwing Italian terrorists.

**Trevor E.T. Forbes, OBE**, joined the Royal Ulster Constabulary in 1950. He rose through the various ranks to his present position of Assistant Chief Constable and Head of Special Branch. Before taking over his present role, some of the posts he held were Head of Force Community Relations Branch, Head of Traffic Branch, and Operations Officer to the Border Area. He attended the Police Staff College at Bramshill, England, in 1976 and 1979. He was made an Officer of the British Empire by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II in 1982.

**Reinhard Rupperecht** is the Deputy Director of the Federal Police Division, Ministry of the Interior, Bonn, West Germany. He is deputy to the director in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Border Patrol. He was a Division Chief in the Munich Police when the 1972 Olympics were held in that city.

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**Oliver B. Revell** is the Assistant Director in charge of the Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation. He is responsible for the FBI's criminal investigations and programs, including the Terrorism Program. He was appointed a Special Agent of the FBI in 1964 and has been assigned to five field offices. He was the Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Chicago Division and Special Agent in Charge of the Oklahoma Division. In 1980 he was promoted to Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division.

Mr. Revell holds a bachelor's degree from East Tennessee State University and a Master of Public Administration degree from Temple University. He is an active member of the American Society for Industrial Security and serves on the International Advisory Committee of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

## State-Sponsored Terrorism: Truth and Consequences\*

Arnaud de Borchgrave  
Editor in Chief  
The Washington Times

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You've all heard of the French poet LaFontaine, who said that every editor pays tribute to the devil, but even with the current rate of inflation, the amount of tribute paid has become, in my judgment, excessive. And that is why, 5 weeks ago today, I accepted the position as editor-in-chief of the Washington Times and gave up my precious and hard-earned freedom—because being senior associate at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies was real freedom.

After covering the Vietnam War for 7 consecutive years, my friend Ian Ward, a British journalist, was finally moved to write from Saigon in 1972 that "never has distortion by the press reached such limits through both willful and unintentional means, and that as a result, the Western press emerged as the most effective weapons in Hanoi's arsenal." And I think the same remark could be applied to Central America today; witness the fiasco up on the Hill last night.

I think the first thing one has to establish as a conservative, which I am, is that we Americans, naturalized as I may be, cannot possibly be against revolutions. How could we be, given our history? What we're against is the hijacking of these revolutions by a tiny minority of Marxists who then proceed to impose a worse form of dictatorship than the one they overthrew. The irrefutable fact today, it seems to me, is that Hanoi triggered guerrilla activity in South Vietnam, manufactured a revolution, and hijacked it all from the very beginning. And General Giap confirmed this analysis in an interview on French television in February of 1983.

Since our defeat in Vietnam, and as recently as February 1983, which I just mentioned, Vietnamese officials have publicly bragged that they "disinformed" us. The former Minister of Justice of the so-called National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, who escaped among the boat people, confirmed that the Tet offensive was, indeed, an unmitigated disaster for the Communist side. Through very clever disinformation operations, however, they managed to convince the American media of precisely the opposite, which, as you may recall, compelled President Johnson to abdicate 2 months later.

So what I am saying in short is that propaganda, disinformation, censorship by omission, and irresponsible journalism played a major role in our defeat. And I'm afraid that a similar scenario seems to be shaping up in Central America.

We seem to have lost our sense of indignation, our sense of anger. We have seen so many things in the press and on television: 12 million killed in 140 wars since the end

of World War II. So when the subject is foreign policy, we instantly get an acute attack of MEGO, "My eyes glaze over."

William Webster, the head of the FBI, said the other day that we have more cases of espionage in our country today than ever before in history. You know better than I do that about a million Americans in industry alone have access to classified material. So I can imagine—perhaps I'm wrong—how perfunctory these security checks have become. The Attorney General himself, now the former attorney general, William French Smith, has confirmed that we have lost control of our own borders. I can testify to that, since when I was researching my last book, *Monimbo*, in 1982, I purchased in Tijuana a green card and a Social Security card; 2 weeks later, I was collecting unemployment compensation in this country with a phony identity.

Bismarck once said that history is quite simply a piece of paper covered with print. The main thing is still to make history, not to write it. History is neutral, and there is nothing evitable about it, as the Russians would have us believe. History is neutral, to be shaped by political and military leaders, not by media stars and public opinion pollsters, which seems to be increasingly our form of government. Experiments in leading from behind—witness Jimmy Carter—invariably prove to be manifest and ludicrous failures. But whether an American President can still make history in this day and age remains to be seen. The War Powers Act of 1973, like the Neutrality Act of the 1930's, has seriously undermined America's role as the world's principal countervailing power. And, in my judgment, no amount of pious pleas for arms control agreements and summit meetings can alter or evade or attenuate the harsh geopolitical reality that our self-avowed enemies consider themselves in a permanent state of war with the Western democracies. And despite their enormous economic difficulties, I don't think we should ever forget that the Soviets are extraordinarily skillful at pursuing their objectives, relentlessly, by all means short of war, objectives that are more traditionally pursued, at least in our Western minds, by war itself. And here, of course, I am referring to state-sponsored terrorism, increasingly funded by narcotics rackets; to subversion; to penetration; but, above all, to disinformation.

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\*This paper is a verbatim transcript of remarks delivered at the 10th Annual Symposium on the Role of Behavioral Science in Physical Security, April 24, 1985.

History, as I am sure most of you would concede, is not going to be made in Geneva in the coming months or years at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. But history is being made at this very moment in Central America, not by us, but by our adversaries.

President Reagan told us, as you may recall, that Central America ranks in geopolitical importance with our strategic interests in Western Europe, NATO, the Persian Gulf, and Japan. Well, if all of that is true, then how does one explain what happened on the Hill last night? What ever happened to President Kennedy's pledge following the Cuba missile crisis when he said,

*The United States is determined to prevent, by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending by force or the threat of force its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere, and to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States.*

If I were in Moscow or Havana or Managua today, analyzing Congressional actions, I would have to conclude that President Kennedy's pledge is, at this point, so much empty rhetoric. I would also have to conclude that the United States has agreed to play a global game of geopolitical football, and we have imposed upon ourselves a constraint that says we cannot cross the 50-yard line. They can cross; they can go all over the field. So the best we can hope for under such circumstances is a tie, but the most probable outcome is a defeat. The House, on four separate occasions prior to what happened last night, turned down \$21 million for the resistance fighters in Nicaragua. Now the figure is down to \$14 million in humanitarian assistance, and even that amount has been turned down. And the cartoon that I ordered for the paper tomorrow morning shows Tip O'Neill sitting in an ambulance, driving it through Contra territory, shouting, "Coffee, donuts . . ." The cartoon is already out of date. Not even donuts now.

The assistance that was requested was for the anti-Communist resistance in Nicaragua. I have banned the term *Contra* except in headlines, because *Contra* is an ideologically motivated word on the left, just as *freedom fighter* is an ideologically motivated word on the right. *Resistance* is a good, strong, neutral word; I remember the word was used in World War II—the Danish resistance and the Belgian resistance—there's nothing wrong with the word resistance.

But it's interesting to note how some liberal Democrats have come to the conclusion that this is an increasingly

legitimate and popular resistance movement in Nicaragua. That was certainly the conclusion of Dr. Robert S. Leiken in his watershed cover story for the *New Republic* (October 8, 1984). He's the editor of the so-called Democratic alternative to the bipartisan Henry Kissinger Commission on Central America. And Leiken came down very hard on the American media covering Nicaragua. This liberal academic accused American journalists, with one exception, the *New York Times* correspondent, of having been taken in, co-opted in effect, by a larger group of Marxist internationalists—a term that, as you know, embraces all the foreign camp followers who express solidarity with the Sandinistas. They're also running loose all over Capitol Hill.

Disaffected Sandinista intellectuals who poured their hearts out to Dr. Leiken in Nicaragua said they were actually afraid to meet with U.S. reporters because they knew that these reporters sympathized with the Sandinistas. I find that a devastating indictment. We have a new generation of journalists in this country—Ben Bradlee's and Dan Rather's disclaimers notwithstanding—a generation spawned by the Vietnam War who have made it their duty to transform our sworn enemies into misunderstood innocents and to portray our own leaders as the foes of democracy and freedom. No mean feat, but they've done it.

Self-appointed opinion molders have turned our free press into a powerful instrument of illusion in defiance of basic political, geopolitical, and historical realities. A recent sample came from William Grieder—you may recall he embarrassed David Stockman at the beginning of the Reagan Administration in that famous *Atlantic* interview. He is now working for *Rolling Stone*, and he says in a recent issue, "America's defense and foreign policies are as rational as a witch doctor's incantations before a primitive tribe. Americans are so brainwashed with fear of Russia that it might seem futile in the present climate to focus on rational alternatives to the Cold War."

This is the new school of journalism that is spreading the plague of self-hatred: America the villain; America the racist; America the exploiter; America the uncompassionate; America always on the wrong side of history. You'd be amazed how many people in my business believe that.

The liberal mediocrats—George Orwell would have called them the "New Aristocrats"—and most Democrats believe that Reagan plunged U.S.-Soviet relations to an all-time low, and that only at the United Nations last September, when he tempered his rhetoric, were we suddenly pulled

back from the brink of a global nuclear holocaust. Nothing could have been further from the truth, but it was quite astonishing how a major disinformation theme became a received idea before it was anointed as a factoid in computer data banks and microfiche filing systems, where it becomes part of our permanent institutional memory.

I mentioned that to Bill Casey the other day; he hadn't thought of it. He said, "Yes, you mean [disinformation] is really in there?" I said, "Of course it's in there. When I have a young reporter who is trying to background a story, he goes to the Nexus system and he punches up whatever he's trying to look up, and there's the disinformation. You can't get it out. It's there permanently."

And perhaps we should explain, all of us who are old enough to remember, that the expression "Cold War" was applied to a period after World War II when the United States and its allies were dedicated to the containment of Communism and Soviet expansionist objectives all over the world. The pundits never tell us that the Cold War period gave birth to the Western world's proudest geopolitical achievements, from the Marshall Plan to the Brussels Pact, the West European Union, NATO, and the Common Market. Then came the period known as "detente," which the Soviets, of course, call peaceful coexistence.

Once again the mediacrats omit to remind their consumers of news that that was the era, beginning in the late 1960's, when we abandoned containment without putting anything credible in its place, and began acquiescing in Moscow's geopolitical objectives from Southeast Asia to the Horn of Africa, and from Angola to South Yemen. All this right up to the invasion of Afghanistan.

President Reagan tried to restore a modified form of containment to our foreign policy, after 10 years of acquiescence and retrenchment, and, as you know, he was rewarded for his labors with accusation of Cold War revivalism. But he succeeded in Grenada. He failed in Lebanon. And the returns are not quite in from Central America, though they don't look too good at this point.

One of my earliest recollections as a young reporter, after 4 years of naval service in World War II, was Averell Harriman telling me, on a background basis, how important it was to help Joseph Stalin; otherwise, more sinister forces lurking in the wings would take over. In other words, in his mind there was something more sinister than Joseph Stalin. I was very young at the time and I swallowed it whole. With each new Soviet succession, the liberal media, prompted by liberal Sovietologists, have described the incoming Soviet leader as a moderate who

wants peaceful coexistence with the West, and as a reformer who is going to turn inward.

Now if you study the Western press, or the "capitalist press" as it was then known, when Stalin succeeded Lenin, the same stuff was being written back then. Nikita Khrushchev, you may recall, was that breath of fresh air who gave us the invasion of Hungary and the Berlin Wall, and who tried to find a shortcut to nuclear parity by putting missiles into Cuba.

Well, Vietnam and Watergate focused our attention and energies elsewhere for about a decade, while Cuba was funding, training, advising, and participating in insurgent movements all over the hemisphere and in many other parts of the world, from the former Belgian Congo, which I covered for *Newsweek*, to the Dhofar province of Oman, which I was also covering. And it was in Havana, in January 1966, at the first Tricontinental Solidarity Conference, that the Soviet bloc secretly decided on a two-track approach for destabilizing the West. I have intelligence reports on this from European agencies. On a government-to-government level it was to be "peaceful coexistence"—the smokescreen behind which the Soviet Union was to achieve global military supremacy while the West was being disarmed psychologically. I don't have to tell military experts in the room that the Soviet bloc's strategic deception apparatus is controlled by the 13th Chief Directorate of the General Staff, for which, of course, we have no equivalent in this country, nor could we have, given the fishbowl environment in which the Department of Defense has to operate.

On another level, the Havana 1966 Compact agreed to organize, fund, and train international terrorist groups through a variety of proxies. I have seen a very long, well-documented French intelligence report dated May 11, 1978, on what went on behind the scenes in Havana in January 1966, and how this global conspiracy has unfolded ever since.

Turkey, as a member of the Atlantic Alliance, was the victim of a reign of terror, as you all know, for 6 years, at the height of the period that we still refer to as detente. All this was masterminded by the KGB via the Bulgarian DS, which operated a multibillion-dollar heroin-for-guns ring based in Sofia and which supplied tens of millions of dollars' worth of weapons to terrorists on the far right and the far left to keep the reign of terror going until the military was reluctantly forced to take over in 1980, to try to restore a semblance of law and order inside a member

country of the Atlantic Alliance. So much for detente. And much of this came out during that trial in the Italian city of Trent in February 1983, as I recall.

In his political testament smuggled out to the West in the spring of 1980, which appeared as the cover story of the *New York Times Magazine*, June 8, 1980, Dr. Andrei Sakharov said we should take very seriously indeed allegations of links between the KGB and its proxies, on the one hand, and international terrorist groups, on the other. Our media not only ignored the warning, but they didn't even bother to carry relevant excerpts.

Well, I am not obsessed by irrational fears, as my liberal detractors claim. But I am obsessed by the reluctance of my colleagues to face certain unfashionable facts about the Soviet Union and its surrogates. Why, for example, was the Cuban drug connection in the United States, which was established beyond a shadow of a legal doubt in a 3-week Federal jury trial in the city of Miami in February 1983, and which continues to this very day—witness the testimony last Friday—virtually ignored by mass media outlets in this country? You know it would not have been ignored if it had been Pinochet, the right-wing dictator of Chile, involved in our drug rackets in Dade County, and skimming the profits to buy guns to ship to Roberto D'Aubuisson. That would have been headlines not only for the next day but for months thereafter.

One of our undercover agents, Jim Herring—who led a rather dangerous life for quite a long time as the undercover agent with Vesco in Cuba and Nicaragua, establishing various drug connections on behalf of the Cuban Secret Service—spent Thursday evening at my paper before his recent testimony on Friday. You may have seen our story Friday morning. The next day, check the *New York Times*; not one word about his testimony. The story didn't appear. Even though this was happening right here in Washington, D.C., the *Washington Post* did not cover the story itself, but printed on page 6 a brief article from the *Los Angeles Times*.

Why did the European media investigate and establish the brazen Soviet involvement in, and manipulation of, the peace movement on both sides of the Atlantic, while our own media dismissed the evidence dug up in Denmark, Holland, Switzerland—hardly bellicose countries—as a dangerous revival of McCarthyism?

The liberal mediacrats, with one notable exception, have gone out of their way to discredit the 25,000-word report by Judge Ilario Martella, the Italian magistrate in charge of the case on the Bulgarian connection with the attempted assassination of the Pope. They would rather believe

Soviet disinformation that the cold-blooded murder of 269 innocent civilians on KAL 007, shot down, as I recall, by a Soviet fighter plane, was the work of the CIA from beginning to end.

You have read recently, and you probably know more about it than I do, about the wave of terrorist bombings of NATO installations in West Germany and other European countries. The intelligence digest that I was editing before I took this new job wrote a year and a half ago that this was going to happen, and that the button would be pushed as soon as the Soviets concluded that their peace offensive to block the deployment of Euromissiles had failed. They learned an important geopolitical lesson in Beirut on October 23, 1983. Two kamikaze terrorists driving 5-ton trucks loaded with explosives managed to trigger the unraveling of the entire Western position in Lebanon and change the course of history. Two guys.

I believe that after prolonged harassment of U.S. and other NATO installations by terrorists in Western Europe, there will be a wave of discouragement on Capitol Hill; people will begin saying, "What on earth are we doing over there? We're not really wanted; let's go home." I think that is the purpose of the exercise.

And "Detente I" failed because it was fatally flawed from the very start, based as it was on wishful thinking. For years we were told that all the Soviets really wanted was nuclear parity with the United States, and now that we had achieved it, we should codify it in SALT I. By signing two dozen bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union in 1972, Nixon and Kissinger were hoping somehow to weave the Soviet Union into a web of mutual interest with the United States, which they thought would temper the Soviets' behavior in the Third World and discourage the Soviets from exploiting what they then believed to be our inevitable defeat in Vietnam. Well, this strategy did not work, quite simply because we failed to grasp the real nature of Moscow's professed policy of peaceful coexistence.

One quick example: Between January 1973, when the Paris peace accords on Vietnam were signed, and April 1975, when Saigon fell to the Communists, the U.S. Congress cut military aid to our South Vietnamese allies by 76 percent. And during that same period, the Soviet Union doubled its military aid to North Vietnam. Yet there were some people here in the Republican Administration at the time who felt that the Soviet Union was trying to help us somehow in Vietnam.

I feel passionately about this, because I've lived it all as a journalist for 38 years, and I've seen the same mistakes



made over and over again, and by the same people. So what do you call it at that point? Is it mere ignorance? In the case of Congressmen Mike Barnes or Chris Dodd, it can't be ignorance. Is it intellectual blindness? Possibly. But I submit to you that it is intentional, willful distortion.

Detente, not the Cold War, was the most dangerous phase of post-World War II history. And as Jean Francois Revel, who is probably France's most important media voice today, wrote in his recent best seller *How Democracies Perish*—and I encourage all of you who haven't read it to do so—detente was not a dream, it was a trap.

So, to conclude, we might ask, "Why do the pragmatists want to lead us back into the same trap?" Well, hope springs eternal, and clever disinformation operations do the rest.

When Yuri Andropov gave up command of the KGB in May 1982 in order to better position himself to succeed Brezhnev, who died 6 months later, our media, as you may recall, led by the *Washington Post*, began printing as straight news the disinformation churned out by Service A of the KGB. Andropov, we were suddenly told, was a closet liberal; a fan of Jacqueline Susann's novels, who had loved *Valley of the Dolls*; a polished speaker of English; a mean tango dancer who would put George Raft to shame; a man with a penchant for Scotch highballs; a man who was sympathetic to Russia's dissidents; and, of course, a reformer.

When KGB disinformation specialists saw well-known Soviet scholars in our universities picking up on this palpably fraudulent nonsense, they must have concluded that American naivete was a terminal disease. The trick worked, because, as you may recall, when Andropov died, George McGovern gushed praise on this brilliant statesman and heaped scorn on President Reagan for blowing an opportunity to meet at the summit and for pushing the world closer to nuclear war. All this is yet another reflection of the first civilization in history to blame itself for the fact that someone else seeks its destruction.

Last December (1984), you may recall, the same thing happened again, when British commentators started regaling us on our networks with the claptrap about the "Gucci couple" in from Moscow. On a visit to London, the Gorbachevs were described as the new Jack and Jackie Kennedy couple of the Soviet Union, but it's amazing to see how many people are writing about this now.

The good news is that the Soviets and their proxies are faced with the spreading phenomenon of anti-Communist

national liberation fronts in Nicaragua, and they will go on, despite Congress, in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, and Cambodia. I went to Angola last summer, to see Jonas Savimbi, and as you know there are 30,000 Cuban troops there; they are losing ground daily to the anti-Marxist guerrilla forces. I don't think that the USSR can cope with its East European commitments, let alone its Third World ones, and I would hate to be in Gorbachev's shoes today, given the fact that the military must be telling him that he is about to lose even his conventional advantage in Western Europe, with our new precision-guided munitions and emerging military technologies, and that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is going to neutralize him effectively within 10 years.

A geopolitical roadmap for the second Reagan term is, we are told, Richard Nixon's book titled *The Real Peace*. The bottom line is hard-nosed detente, a new set of stricter ground rules, a quid for every quo, retaliation for every violation. Well, I hope that these things come to pass, but I have serious reservations, given what happened on the Hill last night. I, as a taxpayer, am beginning to resent a \$300 billion-a-year defense budget when we can't even produce \$14 million for our friends in Nicaragua.

**Audience Participant:** Last night on "Nightline," Senator Kerr held up a copy of a magazine containing a picture of a Contra allegedly stabbing to death an innocent victim. You said that it was interesting that this picture conveniently appeared on the day of the vote in Congress. I wonder if you can expand on the theme of the ability of the press to find every possible evil on one side but not to talk about the oppression by the Sandinistas or what ever, and about what's happening to this generation of journalists?

**Mr. de Borchgrave:** Well, I worked on that for 2 hours last night. I'm actually living at the *Washington Times* these days, and I work practically around the clock. But I was very interested in the timing of that story, and I looked at those pictures with a magnifying glass. I never spent more than 10 or 15 minutes in the bush without my fatigues being a little soiled. And this guy who was butchering the other guy had on immaculately tailored and starched fatigues, and the man who was being killed was lying still, as his throat was being slit. Wouldn't you have had a defensive reaction right away, if someone was trying to kill you? There's something very suspicious about these pictures, as Otto Reich pointed out on "Nightline" last night. Reich recalled what happened 4 or 5 years ago

when almost the entire second page of the *New York Times* carried a story by Ray Bonner describing how Green Berets had stood by during torture training sessions in Central America. That story turned out to be total disinformation; the *New York Times* not only retracted the story 4 months later, but the correspondent concerned, Ray Bonner, has been recalled. So these things do go on.

I could not get the *Newsweek* editors to call me back. The top editors are in Dorado Beach right now for a 2-day annual meeting, which is where I called them. They are all friends of mine, but they wouldn't return my call. I finally said, "I believe that you may be on the verge of another Hitler diary forgery scandal, and want your side of the story. We want to know about your fail-safe devices and the gatekeepers that manned them; we want to know how much checking went into this story."

They wouldn't come to the phone, and the photographer concerned, as you may have read in our story this morning, who purports to be a conservative from Northwestern University, said, "I'm busy on another line talking long distance. I'll get right back to you." He never got back to us, and when we called his number back it wasn't answering. So it gets more and more suspicious by the minute.

This is not to say that atrocities don't go on in civil war situations. Civil wars are horrible, we all know that.

As for the new school of journalism, I can give you a classic example that occurred at the Columbia School of Journalism a year before the invasion of Grenada, when Fred Friendly, who is hardly a conservative, teaching a class there, posed a hypothetical problem remarkably similar to what happened in Grenada a year later. He said, "Let's say there's a secret U.S. military operation about to take place, ordered by the President of the United States. Key congressional leaders have been advised, so there is nothing unconstitutional about it under the War Powers Act. Five journalists are in the pool. They've been sworn to secrecy. You find out about the operation; what are you going to do?" The class unanimously said, "We would blow it wide open." Whereupon Fred Friendly, a little taken aback, said, "Well, what about the lives of the American soldiers involved?" And nobody had an answer to that. Finally one student mustered enough courage to say, "Well, they joined the Army to kill and be killed, didn't they?" And he got a round of applause. That is the new school of journalism. And that's what journalists today will not face up to.

**Audience Participant:** Can we blame it all on our journalists? How about our representatives on the Hill who see the facts and yet, for political reasons, just slip away?

**Mr. de Borchgrave:** To a large degree, we can blame our media. I am not discouraged by the media in London or Paris or Bonn or Rome. There are very strong alternative voices on the right or on the left in those countries. If you're a Frenchman or a Briton who is interested in national or international affairs, you'll read, perhaps, the *Telegraph* on the right and the *Guardian* on the left, and you'll make up your own mind. Nobody is going to tell you how to think. Here, the *Washington Post* tells you how to think, and many of their stories are barely disguised editorials. I don't call that reporting anymore. I took this job because I can't think of a more important endeavor in the world's most important and powerful democracy than to provide one alternative voice on the conservative side of the fence. That's why I'm working 20 hours a day on this job.

To finish the answer, where do these Congressmen get their perceptions? I have run into even conservative Congressmen elected in 1980 who have repeated to me what they had read in the *Washington Post* or the *New York Times* as fact. I hope we'll be providing alternatives for them.

**Audience Participant:** You've shown KGB and Soviet penetration of the Canadian media. Is there anything else going on in that regard?

**Mr. de Borchgrave:** Well, as you know, in 1980 my colleagues dismissed my book *The Spike*, on Soviet disinformation, as totally off the wall; they said that I didn't know what I was talking about, that this silly book was a *figment of a demented imagination*. But Robert Moss and I actually spent 3 years debriefing, befriending, getting to know some 23 defectors from Eastern secret services, and their only objection to the book after it came out was that we had understated the truth.

But now Roy Godson of Georgetown University and Richard Schultz of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, both of whom are Democrats, have written the first scholarly work on disinformation titled *Dezinformatia*. If you haven't read it, I urgently recommend that you do so, so you will have additional arguments when you meet people from the media. The Russians spend \$3 billion to \$4 billion a year on these operations. They have

about a thousand operations a year in the Western media, and to them disinformation is just as important as their army, their navy, their air force, their foreign ministry. It is an integral part of the Soviet Union's arsenal in the pursuit of its worldwide objectives.

And then some people will say, "The same thing goes on at the CIA." This is phony moral equivalence. At the height of the Cold War, of course, there were counter-disinformation operations run by the CIA. I have always considered them to be counterproductive. I think the truth is far better than disinformation. Sometimes it hurts you, but most times it does not. I am always astonished how we in this country give equal time, under the doctrine of fairness, on "Nightline," to the likes of Georgii Arbatov or Vladimir Posner, adjusting their \$400 cufflinks, \$600 Brioni suits, and \$300 gold-rim spectacles while assuring you that they're just like us. I find that mind-boggling, because those people who present Posner or Arbatov to millions of Americans have forgotten something quite simple that Lenin wrote in 1921 in a famous memorandum to his then foreign minister, Chicherin. He said, "To tell the truth is a petty bourgeois habit, whereas for a revolutionary to lie and to lie convincingly is not only a sign of intelligence, but an imperative when furthering a revolutionary course."

**Audience Participant:** How do you explain the fact that if Nicaragua was paid for resistance for the great push... [inaudible] How do you explain that when you have the situation in Cambodia where the Administration has not been providing legal aid, not getting involved, letting the country buy elsewhere. And yet there is a Congressional initiative to force the Administration to provide \$5 million in legal aid. What's the difference?

**Mr. de Borchgrave:** Well, I've asked Congressmen that, I can't get a decent answer. How do you justify the way I phrased it? How do you justify voting for \$250 million worth of aid to the resistance movement in Afghanistan on the Soviet Union's borders, while withholding \$14 million of aid to a resistance movement close to our own borders? It doesn't make any sense.

I tried to explain in the second or third week I was at the *Washington Times*, in a five-part series on the disinformation network that operates in this capital city. It all tracks back to the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), which frequently is described in the *New York Times* or the *Washington Post* as a "liberal think-tank" in Washington. Even David Hartman on "Good Morning America" last week started his Central American segment saying, "According to a report from the Institute for Policy

Studies." Then he went on to talk about Contra atrocities, and Senator Harkin endorsed that report.

A liberal think-tank in Washington? That think-tank is not only on the radical left, but it has espoused most Soviet, Cuban, and North Vietnamese positions for the past 22 years. That's why I ordered up an editorial the next day, in which I changed the name of the show to "Good Grief, America."

**Audience Participant:** You have made a very emotional, very articulate presentation here. You can talk about irresponsible journalism, you can talk about the new generation in the news media, but it is an understatement, I think, to say that the news media form a very powerful institution here within the United States, an institution that has been fueled by the Westmoreland controversy. When you really get down to the bottom line, the news media are out to make big bucks, and you don't make big bucks by being very conventional and traditional. You go where the controversy is; that's what sells papers, and that's what gets people to watch TV.

Now I happen to endorse about everything you said in your presentation, but I am concerned that you are only one person trying to do what you feel is proper within the news media. At the rate of 20 hours a day, you may last 6 months, maybe a year. How can the news media police themselves? Or do the news media really want to police themselves?

**Mr. de Borchgrave:** No, the news media do not want to police themselves; they believe the First Amendment is like an elastic band that you can go on stretching and it will never snap. But one day it will snap, and then heaven help us all. I've never seen so much arrogance in my life as what I see among the media stars in this country.

But I believe in the basic health of the American people, and so does Abe Rosenthal, the editor of the *New York Times*. I had a chat with him the day before yesterday. He's an old friend of mine. He's also an arrogant man, but he realized something last November 6—Election Day—and he's enough of a populist to realize that his paper's out in left field and he's got to try to bring it back to the center, not to the right. And because he's struggling valiantly to move the paper from the left to the center, he is now being called a Stalinist or Fascist by the left-wing press—*The Nation*, *The Progressive*, *Mother Jones*, *In These Times*, and all the rest.

To your statement that papers are in the business of selling news and they sell what sells best, I say that's

nonsense, because most cities have only one newspaper. So readers have no choice. You know from your relatives around the country that most people hate their local paper, but they have to read it because of all the things that are going on in the area.

In this city I'm trying to give people a choice. Do you think I'm getting any advertisers as a result? Zero. There is a total boycott, because of our connection with the Unification Church and the Reverend Moon. Cable Network News recently did a 3-minute segment on the paper in which they interviewed me. They said, "What about your connection with the Reverend Moon?" I said, "My duties for the church are not very arduous. All I have to do on Saturdays is walk the Reverend Moon's Doberman pinscher, and on Sundays I sell flowers at National Airport."

Now, seriously, the question is preposterous. I said, "If you're really looking at church connections, take a look at the *Christian Science Monitor*; the *Deseret News*, controlled by the Mormon Church; the Riverside Church in New York, where the Reverend Sloan Coffin and Cora Weiss and Peter Weiss and IPS have connections directly into newsrooms at the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times*. Then you are really talking about church connections."

As you may remember, when "Sandy" Pollack, an important American Communist who has been very active in the U.S. Peace Council organization and many other groups, died in a plane crash between Havana and Managua on January 19, there was a memorial service for her at the Riverside Church attended by the Cuban, East German, and Russian Ambassadors. They all got up and sang her praises—all devoutly religious people, as I am sure you realize.

So, here I am, trying to do my job, trying to present an alternative view, a voice, whether editorials or reporting, and I am rewarded with a total boycott by the Washington advertising community. Two important local Jews came to lunch with me at the paper yesterday. They were complaining about an Arab-American ad that had appeared before I joined the paper. They said it was riddled with Arab disinformation, quotes taken out of context, and the like. I said, "I wish I had the luxury of killing ads like that; I'd love to kill all political ads, but we have to take whatever business we can get because of you people."

They said, "What do you mean, us?"

I said, "You break that boycott against my paper and then I'll have the luxury of killing political ads. But Woodies

doesn't advertise with us, nor does Garfinckel's—you name it. They just won't touch us. That's what I'm up against."

**Audience Participant:** What influence do you see the various schools of journalism having on the current attitudes of the media?

**Mr. de Borchgrave:** I think it's dreadful. Osborn Elliott is dean of the Columbia School of Journalism, probably the most important one in the country. He was editor-in-chief of *Newsweek* for 12 years, and a good editor, a dear friend of mine. I am godfather to one of his daughters. He was best man when I got married. We're on opposite sides of the political fence. When he became dean, he asked me to join the dean's list of 62 people, including Art Buchwald. He also said, "Will you come once a year and give a talk to my students?" I said, "I'd be delighted to, a privilege." I went once. I was never invited back.

**Audience Participant:** What about the lingering traces of Vietnam in the press [inaudible]... and about the Soviets' not going to get involved?

**Mr. de Borchgrave:** I waited to see all these 10-year Vietnam commemorative issues that *Newsweek* and *Time* and others have done. Mine is coming out next week and it's called, "Vietnam, the Noble Cause." It's an answer to everything I've read in the past month. I think you'll be proud of it. And there is no question in my mind that it was a noble cause.

As for Central America, I think that anybody who understands anything about strategy understands that the Soviets and the Cubans are attempting to outflank the United States there. And in fact when Reagan's domino theory in Central America is dismissed, I ask, "What about Tomas Borge, the strongman of Nicaragua, the Interior Minister, Castro's best friend in that country, himself Cuban-trained, head of the Secret Police?" He gave a long interview to *Playboy* in September 1983 in which he not only confirmed that he is a Communist and proud to be one, but he confirmed Reagan's domino theory. The media never picked up on that, but the question was, "Well, what about Reagan's zany notion that you were the first domino and that if we don't watch out El Salvador will be next, then Honduras, then Guatemala, and eventually Mexico?" Borge replied, "That is one historical prophecy of Ronald Reagan that is absolutely true."

You'd think that would make headlines the next day, but zero.

**Audience Participant:** There was a time when it was difficult for the media representatives or the national leadership to turn the American people around, and that's what we're hearing today.

**Mr. de Borchgrave:** We had Ed Derwinski, the former Congressman, who is now at the State Department as counselor, to lunch at the paper today, and he's seen it from both sides. There's no question in his mind or mine that our Congressmen today are no longer responding to their constituents. They're responding to a disinformation network, and I've never seen one so effective as what I am watching on Capitol Hill today, whether it's IPS or CISPES—the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador. I don't know how many of you know this, but CISPES was formed in the fall of 1980 by Farid Handal, the brother of the head of the Salvadoran Communist Party, Shafik Handal. As the FBI can testify, the first person he contacted in this country was Alfredo Garcia Almeida, a Cuban agent under United Nations cover in New York. The second person was Sandy Pollack. And then the organization grew like so many cancer cells; it has 328 chapters today in this country. It is active on 500 college campuses, in our Congress and in our media.

This is happening in our own society, so what is going on? I am at a loss for words to understand how we tolerate this sort of thing. I can live with classic espionage. I can live with the Soviets' ripping off all of our technological secrets because I know they can't catch up with us. But I cannot live with a mass poisoning of minds. That's exactly what disinformation does. How? By distorting the data and corrupting the process of understanding in such a way that it leads public opinion to react differently from the way it would act if it understood the true nature of reality.

**Audience Participant:** I was at the Bar Camino Real in San Salvador right after the election. All the network crews were all there, and most of their faces were very long. They were lamenting the fact that the election was a nonstory, a real "bummer," as we call it. Most of them were getting ready to go running to Managua the next day to interview Ortega, who was making a name for himself in Central America. They were getting ready for good stories there.

I found their comments about the election's being a nonstory and a bummer astounding. There was a hell of a story, and that was the election—that all the people from extreme left and right went out and voted for moderation. There just wasn't any boom-boom story.

**Mr. de Borchgrave:** If it were just the "bang bang" syndrome, I wouldn't care so much. But it's much more pernicious than that, as you doubtless realize. Otto Reich called me the other day and said, "Do you realize who some of these stringers are in Managua? They're Marxist. They're known Socialist Revolutionary Worker's Party members from the United States, stringers for foreign newspapers."

I said, "My God, Otto, I've seen this all over the world for years. Are you just discovering this today?"

He said, "I'm appalled."

Two weeks before, Otto and I were both at a seminar in Miami, sponsored by the *Miami Herald*, chaired by Heath Meriwether, the executive editor of the *Miami Herald*, and funded by American Express and Exxon. The kickoff speaker was with *Covert Action Information Bulletin*. I couldn't believe it. So I was the first with a hand up when this guy was through. And Merriworth said, "What's your question?"

I said, "I don't have a question, but I have a statement. I don't think anyone in this room realizes what *Covert Action Information Bulletin* is—that it was created in Havana in July of 1978 with one of the people present in this room, William Schapp, a Washington-based lawyer, and Philip Agee, the ideological defector from the CIA. It is a Cuban disinformation operation run on behalf of the KGB, and you present this man as our kickoff speaker here for a seminar on Central American coverage? I personally feel insulted."

And at lunchtime, Meriwether said to Otto Reich, "Don't you think de Borchgrave went a little far this morning?" And Otto Reich said, "No, he's right on target."

Dan James was there too. It was just an appalling show. And Meriwether conceded to Otto Reich that he didn't know anything about the background of *Covert Action Information Bulletin*. How can someone who runs the *Miami Herald* not be aware of this organization?

So, to sum up my profession, I would say deep down we are shallow.

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**Arnaud de Borchgrave** is editor-in-chief of the *Washington Times*. He is a former chief correspondent for *Newsweek* magazine and was associated with the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies until March 1985, when he joined the *Times*.

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## Roster of Participants

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**Commander Jerry B. Agee, USN**  
Head, Navy Anti-Terrorist Alert  
Center  
Naval Investigative Service

**Colonel Raymond L. Anderson, USA**  
Chief, Surety and Management  
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